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INTRODUCTION
Tontines are investment vehicles that can be used to provide retirement
income. A tontine is a financial product that combines the features of an
annuity and a lottery.1 In a simple tontine, a group of investors pool their
money together to buy a portfolio of investments and, as investors die, their
shares are forfeited, with the entire fund going to the last surviving investor. Over the years, this “last survivor takes all” approach has made for some
great fiction.2 For example, in an episode of the popular television series
M*A*S*H, Colonel Sherman T. Potter, as the last survivor of his World War
I unit, got to open the bottle of French cognac that he and his buddies
bought (and share it with his Korean War compatriots).3 On the other hand,
sometimes the fictional plots involved nefarious characters trying to kill off
the rest of the investors to “inherit” the fund.4
1 See Moshe A. Milevsky & Thomas S. Salisbury, Optimal Retirement Tontines for the 21st
Century: With Reference to Mortality Derivatives in 1693, at 2 (May 28, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2271259 (describing tontines as “[p]art
annuity, part lottery and part hedge fund”). An annuity is a financial instrument (e.g., an
insurance contract) that converts a lump sum of money into a stream of income payable over a
period of years, typically for life. The person holding an annuity is called an annuitant. See infra
subsection I.C.2.
2 See, e.g., Tontine, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tontine (last modified Oct. 22,
2014) (click on Popular Culture), archived at http://perma.cc/3UD5-FFE6 (listing plays, movies,
television episodes, and books that feature tontines).
3 M*A*S*H: Old Soldiers (CBS television broadcast Jan. 21, 1980).
4 See, e.g., The Simpsons: Raging Abe Simpson and His Grumbling Grandson in “The Curse of the
Flying Hellfish” (Fox television broadcast Apr. 28, 1996) (depicting an episode in which Grampa
Simpson reveals to his grandson Bart that he and Montgomery Burns were part of a World War II
American army unit that stole priceless art from a German castle, which the last surviving unit
member will inherit); see also The Wild Wild West: The Night of the Tottering Tontine (CBS television
broadcast Jan. 6, 1967) (portraying Jim and Arte protecting a member of an investment group
whose last surviving member would inherit the group’s assets).
Having an incentive to kill someone to earn a profit is an example of what actuaries call a
“moral hazard.” See Moral Hazard, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/
m/moralhazard.asp (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9DHX-FXK8 (defining
“moral hazard” as “[t]he risk that a party to a transaction has not entered into the contract in good
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Of course, tontines can be designed to avoid such mischief. For example,
instead of distributing all of the contributions to the last survivor, a tontine
could make periodic distributions. Historically, for example, governments
issued tontines instead of regular bonds.5 In those tontines, the government
would keep the tontine investors’ contributions but make high annual
dividend payments to the tontine, dividing those payments among the
surviving investors.6 When the last survivor died, the government had no
further debt obligation. For example, in 1693, the English government
issued a tontine to raise one million British pounds to help pay for its war
against France.7 At a time when the regular bond interest rate was capped at
6%, King William’s 1693 tontine, as it is known, entitled the surviving
investors to share in 10% dividend payments to the tontine for the first 7
years and to 7% dividend payments thereafter.8
Over the years, tontines like King William’s became quite popular.9 At
one point, Alexander Hamilton, the United States’s first Secretary of the
Treasury, suggested that the United States could use a tontine to pay off its
Revolutionary War debt.10 All in all, government tontines played an
important role in government finances over a couple of centuries, but they
have since disappeared.11
After the Civil War, tontines emerged as a popular investment for
individuals in the United States, but they fell out of favor at the beginning
of the twentieth century.12 The problem was not with the tontine form but

faith, has provided misleading information about its assets, liabilities or credit capacity, or has an
incentive to take unusual risks in a desperate attempt to earn a profit before the contract settles”).
5 Milevsky & Salisbury, supra note 1, at 2.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 3; see also Moshe A. Milevsky, Portfolio Choice and Longevity Risk in the Late Seventeenth
Century: A Re-Examination of the First English Tontine, FIN. HIST. REV., Oct. 22, 2014, at 1, 4-5
(explaining that the 1693 tontine was a wealthy person’s investment because it required a 100pound contribution at a time when the average laborer made only 16 pounds per year).
8 Milevsky & Salisbury, supra note 1, at 5; see also Milevsky, supra note 7, at 5 (noting that the
structure of the 1693 tontine combatted moral hazard by freezing payments when only 7 members
remained).
9 See, e.g., ROBERT W. COOPER, AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TONTINE PRINCIPLE
6-9 (J. David Cummins ed., 1972) (discussing the English tontine’s effect on early America). See
generally Kent McKeever, A Short History of Tontines, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 491 (2010)
(discussing the early history of the tontine and its possible modern revival).
10 Robert M. Jennings et al., Alexander Hamilton’s Tontine Proposal, 45 WM. & MARY Q. 107,
110-11 (1988).
11 See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 9, at 2-9 (tracing the early history of tontines in France,
England, and the United States).
12 See, e.g., id. at 10-17, 21-22 (discussing the rise of tontines in the United States, the defects
inherent in the original tontine policies, and the abuses of the system that led to their demise);
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with embezzlement and fraud by the holders of tontine funds.13 Investigations of the insurance industry in New York led to the enactment of
legislation in 1906 that all but banned tontines, and tontines have since
been replaced by life insurance and similar financial products.14
We believe that the time has come to revive tontines as a way of
providing reliable, pension-like income for retirees. Specifically, we believe
that variations on the tontine principle—that the share of each member of
the tontine, at her death, is enjoyed by the survivors—can be used to
develop a variety of attractive retirement-income financial products. For
example, tontines could be used to create “tontine annuities” that could be
sold to individual investors.15 These tontine annuities would make periodic
distributions to surviving investors, but unlike traditional tontines, tontine
annuities would solicit new investors to replace those that have died.16
Structured in this way, a tontine annuity could operate in perpetuity.17
In this Article, we consider how the tontine principle could be used to
create “tontine pensions” through which large employers could provide
retirement income for their employees. These tontine pensions would have
several major advantages over most of today’s pensions, annuities, and other
retirement income products.
At the outset, Part I of this Article explains how the current U.S.
retirement system works and how retirees can use pensions, annuities, and
other financial products to generate retirement income.
Next, Part II offers a step-by-step explanation of how tontine funds,
tontine annuities, and tontine pensions could work today. It then compares
tontine pensions with traditional defined benefit pension plans, defined

McKeever, supra note 9, at 507-11 (detailing the nineteenth century beginnings of tontine-like
insurance policies in the United States and the legislative backlash to tontines).
13 See McKeever, supra note 9, at 511 (“The contemporary assessment . . . is that the tontine
aspect of the standard insurance policies served as a distraction and scapegoat in coming up with
remedies for the range of vices in the industry. The problem was not with the form, but with selfdealing management.” (footnote omitted)).
14 See COOPER, supra note 9, at 43-57 (discussing the findings of the Armstrong Committee,
a committee created by the New York legislature to investigate the life insurance business, which
led to legislation virtually banning tontine policies by forbidding insurance companies from
deferring dividend payments beyond one year); see also Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, Tontines for
the Young Invincibles, REGULATION, Winter 2009–2010, at 26, available at http://object.
cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2009/11/v32n4-4.pdf (describing anti-tontine
regulations in New York and their effect on life and health insurance companies).
15 See generally Michael J. Sabin, Fair Tontine Annuity (Mar. 26, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1579932 (explaining how a “fair tontine annuity”
could function).
16 Id. at 12, 22.
17 Id. at 22.
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contribution plans, and so-called “hybrid pensions” (e.g., cash balance
plans). In particular, Part II shows that tontine pensions would have two
major advantages over traditional pensions. First, unlike traditional pensions—which are frequently underfunded—tontine pensions would always
be fully funded. Second, unlike a traditional pension—in which the pension
plan sponsor must bear all the investment and actuarial risks—with a
tontine pension, the plan sponsor bears neither of those risks. These two
features should make tontine pensions a particularly attractive alternative
for employers who wish to provide retirement income security for their
employees but want to avoid the risks associated with a traditional pension.
Part III then develops a model tontine pension for a typical large
employer. We then use that model to estimate the benefits that would be
paid to retirees. For simplicity, the model assumes that, each year, an
employer would contribute 10% of each employee’s salary to a tontine
pension (in the real world, employers could choose to contribute a greater
or lesser percentage of salary on behalf of their employees). The model
generates tontine pension benefits for each retiree that would closely
resemble an actuarially fair variable annuity—i.e., one without high insurance company fees (“loads”).18 Specifically, unlike commercial annuities
which must support insurance agent commissions, insurance company
reserves, risk-taking, and profits, the management and recordkeeping fees
associated with running a tontine pension would be minimal. That means
that tontine pensions would provide significantly higher retirement benefits
than commercial annuities.
Part IV shows how such a model tontine pension could be used to
replace a typical, large, traditional pension plan like the California State
Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS). Like so many other state-run
pension plans, CalSTRS is underfunded; for example, as of June 30, 2013,
CalSTRS was just 66.9% funded, with an unfunded liability of almost $74
billion.19 While replacing CalSTRS with a tontine pension would do
nothing to reduce that $74 billion obligation, it would ensure that California

18 A variable annuity is an annuity that offers a range of investment options. Accordingly, the
value of the annuity and the monthly payments will vary depending on the performance of the
underlying investments. See Variable Annuities: What You Should Know, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/varannty.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/Z4BV-VXY2 (describing the basics of variable annuities).
19 NICK J. COLLIER ET AL., MILLIMAN, CALIFORNIA STATE TEACHERS’ RETIREMENT
SYSTEM DEFINED BENEFIT PROGRAM—2013 ACTUARIAL VALUATION 10 (2014), available at http://
www.calstrs.com/sites/main/files/file-attachments/2013_db_valuation_report.pdf; see also infra
Section IV.A (providing background on CalSTRS).
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would never again have to worry about underfunding attributable to future
benefit accruals.
Finally, Part V discusses how to solve some of the technical problems
that would arise in implementing a tontine pension.
I. PENSIONS, ANNUITIES, AND OTHER LIFETIME INCOME
MECHANISMS TODAY
Longevity risk—the risk of outliving one’s retirement savings—is
probably the greatest risk facing current and future retirees.20 At present,
for example, a 65-year-old man has a 50% chance of living to age 88 and a
25% chance of living to age 96, and a 65-year-old woman has a 50% chance
of living to age 90 and a 25% chance of living to age 97.21 The joint life
expectancy of a 65-year-old couple is even more remarkable: there is a 50%
chance that at least one 65-year-old spouse will live to age 94 and a 25%
chance that at least one will live to 100.22 In short, most individuals and
couples will need to plan for the possibility of retirements that can last for
30 years or more.
Elderly Americans can generally count on Social Security benefits to
cover at least a portion of their retirement income needs. In addition,
retirees use pensions, annuities, and a variety of other mechanisms to ensure
that they have adequate incomes throughout their retirement years. These
financial mechanisms are discussed in turn.
A. Social Security
Social Security provides monthly cash benefits to most retirees and their
families.23 A worker builds Social Security protection by working in
20 The top risks for today’s retirees include market volatility, taxes, longevity, healthcare
needs, and unexpected events. Common Retirement Risks, AMERIPRISE FIN., https://
www.ameriprise.com/retire/planning-for-retirement/retirement-risks (last visited Jan. 16, 2015),
archived at https://perma.cc/QD7S-4UV7. See generally YOUNGKYUN PARK, EMP. BENEFIT
RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 357, RETIREMENT INCOME ADEQUACY WITH
IMMEDIATE AND LONGEVITY ANNUITIES (2001), available at http://www.ebri.org/
pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_05-2011_No357_Annuities.pdf (discussing strategies for individuals with
retirement income to manage three types of risk: investment income, longevity, and long-term
care).
21 PRUDENTIAL, SHOULD AMERICANS BE INSURING THEIR RETIREMENT INCOME ? 3
(2013), available at http://research.prudential.com/documents/rp/InsuringRetirementIncome.pdf?
doc=InsuringRetirementIncome&bu=SI&ref=website&cid=2.
22 Id.
23 See JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK 184-90 (2006) (giving an
overview of the Social Security system); Staff of H. Comm. On Ways & Means, 113th Cong.,
Green Book: Background Material and Data on the Programs Within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on

762

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 755

employment that is covered by Social Security and paying the applicable
payroll taxes.24 Workers over age 62 generally are entitled to Social Security
retirement benefits if they have worked in covered employment for at least
10 years.25 Benefits are based on a measure of the worker’s earnings history
in covered employment. Most importantly, benefits are indexed each year
for inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index.26 While historically
“full retirement age” was age 65, it is currently age 66, and it is gradually
increasing to age 67 for workers born after 1959 (who will reach age 67 in or
after 2027).27 In June 2014, Social Security paid retirement benefits to 38.5
million retired workers, and the average monthly benefit paid to a retired
worker was $1300.04.28

Ways and Means (Nov. 2014), http://greenbook.waysandmeans.house.gov/2014-green-book/chapter1-social-security/social-security-introduction-and-overview, archived at http://perma.cc/VN56P3TT (“Social Security is a self-financed program that provides monthly cash benefits to retired
or disabled workers and their family members, and to the family members of deceased workers.”).
24 For 2015, employees and employers each pay a Social Security retirement tax of 5.6% on
up to $118,500 of wages, for a combined Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) rate of 10.6%—
the lion’s share of the total 15.3% collected for OASI, Disability Insurance (DI), and Medicare.
Self-employed workers pay an equivalent combined OASI, DI, and Medicare tax of 15.3% on their
first $118,500 of net earnings. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., FACT SHEET: 2015 SOCIAL SECURITY
CHANGES, available at http://www.ssa.gov/news/press/factsheets/colafacts2015.pdf; Social Security
& Medicare Tax Rates, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/oact/progdata/taxRates.html
(last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/CL9V-JVDX.
25 See 42 U.S.C. § 402(a) (2012) (describing eligibility for old-age insurance benefits); id.
§ 414(a)(2) (defining a “fully insured individual” as, among other definitions, an individual having
at least “40 quarters of coverage”).
26 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., FACT SHEET: 2015 SOCIAL S ECURITY CHANGES, supra note 24.
27 Retirement Planner: Full Retirement Age, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., http://
www.socialsecurity.gov/retire2/retirechart.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/QX7T-S2TQ.
28 Monthly Statistical Snapshot, June 2014, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN. tbl.2 (July 2014),
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot/2014-06.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
9ExJ-C8ZU. In addition, a means-tested Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program provides
monthly cash benefits to certain low-income elderly, disabled, or blind Americans. Supplemental
Security Income Home Page, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.socialsecurity.gov/ssi/index.
htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/B2S6-4K8T. In 2015, the maximum
federal SSI benefit for a single individual is $733 per month, and the maximum for a couple is
$1100 per month. SSI Federal Payment Amounts for 2015, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/SSI.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://
perma.cc/D72T-6JQV?type=image. In June 2014, 2.1 million elderly Americans received SSI
benefits from the federal government, and their average monthly benefit was $430.34. Monthly
Statistical Snapshot, June 2014, supra, tbl.3.
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B. Pensions
The United States has a voluntary pension system, and employers can
decide whether and how to provide pension benefits to their employees.29
However, when employers do provide pensions, those pensions are typically
subject to regulation under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA).30
1. Retirement Savings Are Tax-Favored
Most pension plans qualify for favorable tax treatment. Basically,
employer contributions to a pension are not taxable to the employee;31 the
pension fund’s earnings on those contributions are tax-exempt;32 and
workers pay taxes only when they receive distributions of their pension
benefits.33 Nevertheless, the employer is allowed a current deduction for its

29 Jonathan Barry Forman & George A. (Sandy) Mackenzie, The Cost of “Choice” in a
Voluntary Pension System, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF E MPLOYEE BENEFITS AND
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION § 6.01 (2013).
30 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31 & 42 U.S.C.). See generally JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND B ACKGROUND RELATING TO THE TAX TREATMENT
OF RETIREMENT SAVINGS (2012), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=
startdown&id=4418 (providing information about the tax rules applicable to retirement savings
arrangements).
31 I.R.C. § 402(b)(1) (2012).
32 Id. § 501(a).
33 Id. §§ 72(a)(1), 402(b)(2). See generally IRS, PENSION AND ANNUITY INCOME (2015),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p575.pdf (explaining the tax treatment of distributions
from pension and annuity plans). In general, a participant’s pension benefits will be fully taxable if
the participant’s employer contributed all of the costs for the pension without including any of the
contributions in the employee’s taxable wages. Id. at 11. On the other hand, if an individual made
after-tax contributions to a pension or annuity, she can exclude part of her pension or annuity
distributions from income. Id. More specifically, under I.R.C. §§ 72 and 402, the individual can
exclude a fraction of each benefit payment from income. That fraction (the “exclusion ratio”) is
based on the amount of premiums or other after-tax contributions made by the individual. I.R.C.
§§ 72(b), 402(c) (2012); see also IRS, supra, at 11-15 (explaining the calculation of the amount of
pension payments that can be excluded from income). The exclusion ratio enables the individual
to recover her own after-tax contributions tax free and to pay tax only on the remaining portion of
benefits which represents income. IRS, supra, at 11-15. Taxpayers who began receiving annuity
payments from a qualified retirement plan after November 18, 1996 generally can use the so-called
“Simplified Method” to calculate the tax-free part of their benefits. Id. at 12-13. Under the
Simplified Method, the Code provides a table with a fixed number of anticipated payments that
depends upon the annuitant’s age as of the annuity starting date. Id. The taxpayer then divides her
total after-tax contributions over the applicable number of anticipated payments and excludes the
amount so determined each year. Id.
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contributions, within limits.34 Favorable tax rules are also available for
individual retirement accounts (IRAs)35 and Roth IRAs.36
2. Types of Pension Plans
Pension plans generally fall into two broad categories based on the
nature of the benefits provided: defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans.
a. Defined Benefit Plans
In a defined benefit plan, an employer promises its employees a specific
benefit at retirement.37 To provide that benefit, the employer typically
makes payments to a trust fund, the fund grows with investment returns,
and eventually the employer withdraws money from the trust fund to pay
the promised benefits.38 Employer contributions are based on actuarial
valuations, and the employer bears all of the investment risks and responsibilities.39
For example, a plan might provide that a worker’s annual retirement
benefit (B) is equal to 2% multiplied by the number of years of service ( yos)
multiplied by final average compensation ( fac) (B = 2% × yos × fac). Under
this traditional, final-average-pay formula, a worker who retires after 30
years of service with a final average compensation of $50,000 would receive
a pension of $30,000 a year for life ($30,000 = 2% × 30 yos × $50,000 fac).40
While many defined benefit plans allow for lump-sum distributions, the

34
35

I.R.C. § 404(a) (2012).
Id. § 219(a). Almost any worker can set up an IRA with a bank or other financial institution. In 2015, individuals without pension plans can contribute and deduct up to $5500 to an
IRA, although individuals over age 50 can contribute and deduct another $1000 (for a total of up to
$6500), and spouses can contribute and deduct similar amounts. Press Release, IRS, IRS
Announces 2015 Pension Plan Limitations; Taxpayers May Contribute up to $18,000 to their 401(k)
Plans in 2015 (Oct. 23, 2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Announces-2015Pension-Plan-Limitations-1.
36 I.R.C. § 408A (2012). Unlike regular IRAs, contributions to Roth IRAs are not tax deductible. Id. § 408A(c)(1). Instead, withdrawals are tax free. Id. § 408A(d)(1). Like regular IRAs,
however, the earnings on Roth IRA investments are tax exempt. Id. § 408A(d)(2).
37 FORMAN, supra note 23, at 215.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Final average compensation is often computed by averaging the worker’s salary over the
last three or five years prior to retirement. Alternatively, some plans use career average compensation instead of final average compensation. Under a career earnings formula, benefits are based on
a percentage of an average of an employee’s career earnings for every year of service by the
employee. Id.
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default benefit is a retirement income stream in the form of an annuity for
life.41
Traditional defined benefit plans in the real world are often underfunded
for a variety of reasons.42 For example, the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC) has already bailed out thousands of failed privatesector pension plans. Indeed, according to its 2013 annual report, the PBGC
paid $5.5 billion to 900,000 retirees in more than 4600 failed private
pension plans in its 2013 fiscal year, and the PBGC expects that another
620,000 workers will receive benefits when they retire.43 Likewise, at the
end of July 2014, pension plans sponsored by S&P 1500 companies were
only 85% funded, reflecting a collective deficit of $340 billion.44 Many
government pension plans are also underfunded. On average, state public
pensions in the United States were only 70.9% funded in 2012, reflecting
cumulative unfunded liabilities of $894 billion.45
b. Defined Contribution Plans
Under a typical defined contribution plan, the employer simply determines
a specified percentage of a worker’s compensation that should be set aside
and then contributes that percentage to an individual investment account

41 In the United States, defined benefit plans are generally designed to provide annuities, i.e.,
“definitely determinable benefits . . . over a period of years, usually for life, after retirement.”
Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (2012).
42 Traditional defined benefit plans can easily become underfunded for three reasons: (1) the
employers promise their employees additional benefits for past service, (2) the employers fail to
make their actuarially required contributions, or (3) the assets held in the plan decline in value
because of market volatility.
43 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., HELPING SECURE RETIREMENTS: PBGC ANNUAL
REPORT 2013, at 5 (2013), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/2013-annual-report.pdf.
44 S&P 1500 Pension Deficits Remain Above Year-End 2013 Levels, MERCER (Aug. 5, 2014),
http://www.mercer.com/newsroom/sp-1500-pension-deficits-remain-above-year-end-2013levels0.html, archived at http://perma.cc/YV3Z-G97H; see also S&P DOW JONES INDICES, S&P
500 CORPORATE PENSIONS AND OTHER P OST-EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS (OPEB): THE
FINAL FRONTIER 4 (2014), available at http://www.spindices.com/documents/research/researchsp500-corporate-pensions-and-opeb-the-final-frontier-2013.pdf (noting that companies in the S&P
500 were 87.9% funded in the fiscal year 2013, meaning they were underfunded by $224.46 billion).
45 STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS SERV., U.S. S TATE PENSION FUNDING: STRONG
INVESTMENT RETURNS COULD LIFT FUNDED RATIOS, BUT LONGER-TERM CHALLENGES
REMAIN
16-17
tbl.3A
(2014),
available
at
http://www.standardandpoors.com/
spf/upload/Events_US/US_PF_Webcast_Pensart1.pdf; see also Alicia H. Munnell, Jean-Pierre
Aubry & Mark Cafarelli, The Funding of State and Local Pensions: 2013–2017, ST. & LOC.
PENSION PLANS (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Bos. Coll., Chestnut Hill, Mass.), July 2014, at 2
(2014), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/slp_39.pdf (finding that a sample
of 150 state and local plans was just 72% funded in 2013 (underfunded by $1.2 trillion)).
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for that worker.46 For example, contributions might be set at 10% of annual
compensation. Under such a plan, a worker who earned $50,000 in a given
year would have $5000 contributed to an individual investment account on
her behalf ($5000 = 10% × $50,000). Her benefit at retirement would be
based on all such contributions, plus investment earnings.47 Unlike
traditional defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans usually make
distributions in lump sum or periodic distributions rather than life annuities.48
There are many different types of defined contribution plans, including
money purchase pension plans, savings and thrift plans, deferred profitsharing plans, savings incentive match plans (SIMPLE), simplified employee
pensions (SEPs), and employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs).49 Most
notably, according to Internal Revenue Code section 401(k), profit-sharing
and stock bonus plans often include a feature that allows workers to choose
between receiving cash currently or deferring taxation by placing the money
in a trust.50 Consequently, these plans are often called “401(k) plans,” and
they are the most popular type of retirement plan in the United States.51
The maximum amount of such elective deferrals that can be made by an
individual in 2015 is $18,000, although workers over the age of 50 can
contribute another $6000 (for a total of up to $24,000).52 Since 2006,
employers have also been permitted to set up Roth 401(k) plans.53
46 FORMAN, supra note 23, at 215-16; EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., FUNDAMENTALS
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 64 (6th ed. 2009), available at http://www.ebri.org/
pdf/publications/books/fundamentals/2009/06_DB-DC_RETIREMENT_Funds_2009_EBRI.pdf
(describing the function and types of defined contribution plans).
47 Defined contribution plans are also known as “individual account” plans because each
worker has her own account, as opposed to defined benefit plans, in which the plan’s assets are
pooled for the benefit of all of the employees.
48 TOWERS WATSON, INTERNATIONAL PENSION PLAN S URVEY: REPORT 2011, at 15
(2011), available at http://www.towerswatson.com/en/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-Results/
2011/12/International-Pension-Plan-survey-2011 (indicating that lump sums distributions are “by
far the most prevalent” form of distribution for defined contribution plans).
49 See Six Ways to Save for Retirement, PROGRAM PERSP. (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2011, at 2-3, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/perspectives/
program_perspectives_vol3_issue3.pdf (introducing and describing six types of defined
contribution plans).
50 I.R.C. § 401(k) (2012).
51 BLS Examines Popular 401(k) Retirement Plans, PROGRAM PERSP. (U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 2010, at 1, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/perspectives/
program_perspectives_vol2_issue6.pdf (asserting that there has been a “wide-spread movement
towards defined contribution plans, such as 401(k) and 403(b) . . . in private industry and to a
lesser extent, in State and local government”).
52 IRS, supra note 35.
53 I.R.C. § 402A(b)(1) (2012) (“The term ‘qualified Roth contribution program’ means a
program under which an employee may elect to make designated Roth contributions in lieu of all
or a portion of elective deferrals the employee is otherwise eligible to make under the applicable
OF
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Because retirement benefits are based on the retiree’s individual account
balance, benefits can vary dramatically depending upon investment returns
and interest rates. For example, over the past decade, a withdrawal strategy
based on taking 4% of the balance in a retiree’s account annually would have
led to dramatically different payouts in the peak stock market years of 2007
and 2014, as opposed to the bottom of the recession in 2009.54 Using an
account balance to buy an annuity would also not fully offset those risks, as
fixed annuity payouts vary with market interest rates,55 and variable annuity
payouts vary with the performance of the underlying assets (just as they
would with payouts under a 4% strategy).56
c. Hybrid Retirement Plans
So-called “hybrid” retirement plans mix the features of defined benefit
and defined contribution plans. For example, a cash balance plan is a
defined benefit plan that closely resembles a defined contribution plan.57
Like other defined benefit plans, employer contributions are based on
actuarial valuations, and the employer bears all of the investment risks and
responsibilities. Like defined contribution plans, however, cash balance
plans provide workers with individual accounts (albeit hypothetical).58 A
simple cash balance plan might allocate 10% of salary to each worker’s
account annually and credit the account with 5% interest on the account’s
balance. Under such a plan, a worker who earns $50,000 in a given year
retirement plan.”). Unlike regular 401(k) plans, contributions to Roth 401(k) plans are not
excludable. Id. § 402A(a)(1). Instead, withdrawals are tax free. Id. § 402A(d)(1). Like regular
401(k) plans, however, the earnings on Roth 401(k) plan investments are tax exempt. Id.
54 The Dow Jones Industrial Average hit 14,000 in October 2007, fell to around 7000 in February 2009, and rose to more than 17,000 in September 2014. Dow Jones Industrial Average,
GOOGLE FINANCE, https://www.google.com/finance?q=INDEXDJX%3A.DJI&ei=bXBqUsidGJ
C2lAOrxQE (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) (follow “Historical Prices” hyperlink, set daily price time
period, then follow “update” hyperlink); see also infra subsection I.C.1 for a discussion of the socalled 4% rule.
55 See The Dangers of Buying an Annuity When Interest Rates are Low, ANNUITY DIG.,
http://www.annuitydigest.com/blog/tom/dangers-buying-annuity-when-interest-rates-are-low (last
visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/R8Y9-TKJM (warning how interest rate
fluctuations can cause annuities to become very expensive because fixed annuity payments are
based on prevailing interest rates).
56 David John Marotta, The False Promises of Annuities and Annuity Calculators, FORBES (Aug.
27, 2012, 8:54 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidmarotta/2012/08/27/the-false-promises-ofannuities-and-annuity-calculators, archived at http://perma.cc/85V5-9WLB (describing how
inflation rates change the buying power of the variable annuity).
57 See Jonathan Barry Forman & Amy Nixon, Cash Balance Pension Plan Conversions, 25
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 379, 387 (2000) (“[A] cash balance plan is a defined benefit plan that
looks like a defined contribution plan.”).
58 Id.
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would receive an annual cash balance credit of $5000 ($5000 = 10% ×
$50,000), plus an interest credit equal to 5% of the balance in her hypothetical account as of the beginning of the year.
3. The Regulation of Employment-Based Plans
Since ERISA’s enactment, an entire system has emerged to regulate
pensions.59 Pension plans must be operated for the exclusive benefit of
employees or their beneficiaries, and plan assets generally must be held in a
trust.60 To protect the interests of plan participants, ERISA requires
significant reporting and disclosure in the administration and operation of
employee benefit plans.61 ERISA also imposes extensive fiduciary responsibilities on employers and administrators of employee benefit plans.62
ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code also impose many other requirements on retirement plans, including rules governing normal retirement

59 See, e.g., About PBGC, PENSION BENEFIT G UARANTY CORP., http://
www.pbgc.gov/about (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/48R2-LALW (stating
that PBGC’s purpose is to protect and enhance retirement security for American workers and
their families); About the Employee Benefits Security Administration, U.S. DEPARTMENT LAB.,
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/aboutebsa/main.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/ZQ68-L8TJ (introducing the Employee Benefits Security Administration’s
commitment to educating and assisting workers, retirees, and their families covered by private
retirement plans); Tax Information for Retirement Plans, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/
G6UF-Q4AT (providing a wide array of tax-related information and services for retirement
plans). The IRS and the U.S. Department of Labor also have significant responsibilities with
respect to IRAs and Roth IRAs.
60 I.R.C. § 401(a) (2012) (“A trust created or organized in the United States and forming part
of a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan of an employer for the exclusive benefit of his
employees or their beneficiaries shall constitute a qualified trust under this section . . . .”);
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2012) (“Except as
provided in subsection (b) of this section, all assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in
trust by one or more trustees.”).
61 See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 1021 (2012)
(requiring the plan administrator to provide a summary plan description to plan participants, and
annual, terminal, and supplementary reports to the Secretary of Labor).
62 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 401(a) (2012) (outlining qualification requirements for qualified pensions,
profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 404,
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2012) (requiring a fiduciary to diversify investments of the plan as
warranted by the circumstances to minimize the risk of large losses). In addition, prohibited
transaction rules prevent parties in interest from engaging in certain transactions with an
employee benefit plan. See I.R.C. § 4975 (2012) (imposing a tax on prohibited transactions
conducted with disqualified persons); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 406, 29
U.S.C. § 1106 (2012) (enumerating prohibited transactions for fiduciaries). For example, an
employer usually cannot sell, exchange, or lease any property to the plan. Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 § 406(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(A) (2012).
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age,63 participation,64 coverage,65 vesting standards,66 benefit accrual,67
limitations on contributions and benefits,68 nondiscrimination,69 and
minimum funding standards.70
Pertinent here, federal laws outside of ERISA and the Internal Revenue
Code can also impose limits on pension plans. For example, even though
women tend to have longer life expectancies than men,71 Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars pension plans from requiring higher contributions
from women than men or paying women lower benefits than men.72
C. Other Sources of Lifetime Income
In addition to accumulating retirement assets through the Social Security
and pension systems, individuals can save on their own. Investment income
is generally subject to federal personal income tax rates of up to 39.6% in
2015;73 however, dividend income and capital gains are generally taxed at no
more than a 20% rate.74 Also, there are various tax advantages associated

63 I.R.C. § 411(a)(8) (2012); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 3(24), 29
U.S.C. § 1002(24) (2012).
64 I.R.C. § 410(a) (2012); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 202, 29
U.S.C. § 1052 (2012).
65 I.R.C. § 410(b) (2012).
66 I.R.C. § 411(a) (2012); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 203, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1053 (2012).
67 I.R.C. § 411(b) (2012); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 204, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1054 (2012).
68 I.R.C. § 415 (2012).
69 Id. § 401(a)(4).
70 Id. § 412; Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 1082
(2012).
71 See supra text accompanying note 21.
72 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012); Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity &
Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1074-75 (1983) (per curiam) (finding that Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from paying lower monthly retirement
benefits to a woman than to a man who has made the same contributions); City of L.A. Dep’t of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (finding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 prohibits an employer from requiring female employees to make larger contributions to its
pension plan than male employees because of mortality table differentials between the sexes).
73 I.R.C. § 1 (2012); Rev. Proc. 2014-61, 2014-47 I.R.B. 860, 861 § 3.01.
74 I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(D) (2012).
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with investing in homes,75 state and local bonds,76 annuities,77 and life
insurance.78
Retirees can use a variety of approaches to generate retirement income
from their voluntary savings.79 One approach is for retirees to commit to
systematic withdrawals of, for example, 4% of their account balances each
year—a strategy that has a relatively low risk of ruin (running out of money
before death).80 Traditional lifetime annuities offer another approach for
spreading retirement savings out over a lifetime. Another alternative
involves buying longevity insurance, for example, buying a deferred annuity
at age 65 that starts making payments only if the annuitant lives past age
85.81 Retirees can also invest in other financial products that can provide
guaranteed lifetime benefits. These are discussed in turn.
1. Systematic Withdrawals
One of the simplest and most common strategies for managing retirement
savings is to invest all of the retirement savings in a diversified portfolio and
then use a conservative withdrawal rate and a systematic withdrawal plan
(SWP) designed to have a high probability that the retirement savings will

75 For example, home mortgage interest is generally deductible, and gains from the sale of a
personal residence are often excludable. Id. §§ 121, 163(a)-(h).
76 For example, gross income does not include interest on any state or local bond. Id. § 103.
77 See supra note 33 for a more in-depth explanation of how an annuitant can often exclude a
fraction of each annuity payment from income under I.R.C. § 72 (2012).
78 See I.R.C. § 101(a) (2012) (excluding life insurance proceeds paid by reason of death of the
insured from gross income calculations).
79 See, e.g., GARY C. BHOJWANI, ALLIANZ LIFE I NS. CO. OF N. AM., RETHINKING
WHAT’S AHEAD IN RETIREMENT 13 (2011), available at http://assets.knowledge.allianz.com/
downloads/Allianz_life_rethinking_what_s_ahead_in_retirementent_1154.pdf (outlining how annuities
can generate guaranteed retirement income for life); SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES, DESIGNING A
MONTHLY PAYCHECK FOR RETIREMENT 3-7 (2012), available at http://www.soa.org/
workarea/downloadasset.aspx?id=30089 (discussing the different options for generating retirement
income and important factors to consider when deciding which one to choose); Anthony Webb,
Making Your Nest Egg Last a Lifetime, ISSUE IN BRIEF (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Bos. Coll.,
Chestnut Hill, Mass.), Sept. 2009, at 2-3, available at https://npers.ne.gov/SelfService/public/
howto/publications/MakingYourNesteggLast.pdf (examining alternatives and their tradeoffs on
how to convert accumulated savings into a monthly paycheck). See generally BONNIE-JEANNE
MACDONALD ET AL., SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES, RESEARCH AND REALITY—A LITERATURE
REVIEW ON DRAWING DOWN RETIREMENT FINANCIAL SAVINGS (2011), available at http://
www.soa.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=19866 (reviewing existing literature advising
retirees on how to draw down their financial savings).
80 See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman, Optimal Distribution Rules for Defined Contribution Plans:
What Can the United States and Australia Learn from Other Countries?, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION § 3.03[2] (2012).
81 Id. § 3.01.
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last for 20 or 30 years.82 In that regard, financial planners often suggest
following the so-called “4% rule.”83 The basic idea is to set spending at 4% of
retirement savings and invest those savings in a portfolio with 50% stocks
and 50% bonds.84 Each year thereafter, spending is increased to keep up
with inflation. For example, assuming that an individual has a $1,000,000
nest egg, in the first year of retirement she would withdraw 4% ($40,000),
and each year thereafter that dollar amount would increase to keep up with
inflation.85 Assuming a 3% annual inflation rate, annual withdrawals would
increase to $41,200 in the second year, $42,436 in the third year, and so on.
While there is a possibility of running out of money before death, many
financial planners believe this strategy can usually work for 30 years. To
minimize the prospect of outliving one’s nest egg in the recent economic
recession, however, some financial advisors advised retirees to skip their
scheduled inflation adjustments or to withdraw less than 4% of their new
balances.86

82
83

Id. § 3.03[4].
See William P. Bengen, Determining Withdrawal Rates Using Historical Data, J. FIN. P LAN.,
Oct. 1994, at 174-75 (explaining, using historical data, why retirees should withdraw no more than
4% of their retirement savings each year); see also JANEMARIE MULVEY & PATRICK P URCELL,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40008, CONVERTING RETIREMENT SAVINGS INTO INCOME:
ANNUITIES AND PERIODIC WITHDRAWALS 17 (2008) (“[A] large body of research on safe
withdrawal rates for individuals has determined that a real withdrawal rate in the neighborhood of
4 percent of the initial portfolio has a low chance of running out of money.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Benjamin Bridges, Robert Gesumaria & Michael V. Leonesio, Assessing the
Performance of Life-Cycle Portfolio Allocation Strategies for Retirement Saving: A Simulation Study, SOC.
SECURITY BULL., 2010, at 23 (examining the performance of life-cycle portfolio allocation
strategies with varying exposure to stock and bond market risk based on observed historical U.S.
asset returns).
84 Bengen, supra note 83, at 175.
85 This example is taken from Eleanor Laise, A Strategy for a Lifetime of Income, KIPLINGER
(Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.kiplinger.com/features/archives/krr-a-strategy-for-a-lifetime-of-income.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/DP7N-QK9Q.
86 Id.; see also MICHAEL FINKE, WADE D. PFAU & DAVID M. BLANCHETT, THE 4
PERCENT RULE IS NOT SAFE IN A LOW-YIELD WORLD (2013), available at
http://wsisonline.com/papers_files/The%204%20Percent%20Rule.pdf (advising against the 4%
rule); Kelly Greene, Say Goodbye to the 4% Rule, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2013, http://
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324162304578304491492559684, archived at http://
perma.cc/QA5Z-3HT3 (explaining that due to market forces eroding the value of retiree’s nest
eggs, the 4% rule puts retirees at risk of running out of money); Eilene Zimmerman, 4% Rule for
Retirement Withdrawals Is Golden No More, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/05/15/business/retirementspecial/the-4-rule-for-retirement-withdrawals-may-beoutdated.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/YRQ9-32XV (“Many financial advisors are
rejecting the 4 percent rule as out of touch with present realities.”).
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2. Lifetime Annuities
Traditional lifetime annuities can also provide lifetime retirement
income.87 For example, for a 65-year-old man who purchased a $100,000
immediate, level-payment annuity without inflation protection as of January
1, 2014, the annual payout would be around $6864 or 6.86% of the annuity’s
purchase price.88 Because women tend to live longer than men, the annual
payout for a 65-year-old woman who elected an immediate, level-payment
annuity as of January 1, 2014 would be only $6408, or 6.41% of the annuity’s
purchase price.89
With inflation-adjusted annuities, annual payouts would start lower but
could end up higher. For example, if the hypothetical 65-year-old man
instead chose an annuity stream with a 3% escalator, the annual payout for
the first year would be just $5064.90
3. Longevity Insurance
Alternatively, retirees can protect against longevity risk by purchasing
longevity insurance.91 The typical approach is to buy a “deferred annuity” at
age 65 that starts making annual payments only if the annuitant lives past
age 80 or 85. For example, in February 2012, a 65-year-old man could have
invested $100,000 in a MetLife deferred annuity, and beginning at age 85,

87 Farrell Dolan, Applying the 4-Box Strategy to Retirement Income Planning: Generating a
Lifetime of Income, LIMRA’S MARKETFACTS Q., Fall 2009, at 84, 88, available at
http://pjwalkercommunications.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/Market-Facts.pdf (“This single
product solution offers a high cash flow and income is guaranteed for life.”); Darla Mercado,
Making the Case for Annuities, INVESTMENTNEWS (Mar. 25, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://
www.investmentnews.com/article/20120325/REG/303259969/making-the-case-for-annuities,
archived at http://perma.cc/ZZ6X-KFFU (explaining that annuities remain an attractive option
despite changes in the economy reducing their returns).
88 See Immediate Annuities Update, ANNUITY SHOPPER , Winter 2014, at 18 tbl.5, available at
http://www.immediateannuities.com/pdfs/as/annuity-shopper-2014-01.pdf (showing average monthly
payout for 65-year-old man of $572, a total of $6864 per year).
89 Id. (showing average monthly payout for 65-year-old woman of $534, a total of $6408 per
year).
90 Id. (showing an average monthly payout for 65-year-old man with 3% cost of living
adjustment of $422 in the first year of his retirement, for a total of $5064 for the first year).
91 See Jason S. Scott, The Longevity Annuity: An Annuity for Everyone?, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 43-44, available at http://corp.financialengines.com/employer/FELongevityAnnuity-FAJ-08.pdf (explaining the advantages of longevity annuities as compared to
immediate annuities); Anthony Webb, Guan Gong & Wei Sun, An Annuity that People Might
Actually Buy 2 (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Bos. Coll., Working Paper No. 7-10, 2007), available at
https://www2.bc.edu/~sunwc/paper/ib_7-10.pdf (discussing calculations of the value of longevity
insurance).
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he would receive a level lifetime income of $25,451.04 per year.92 Therefore,
with a relatively small upfront investment, a retiree can secure an income
stream that starts sometime in the future. The retiree can then use the rest
of her savings to cover the fixed number of years until the year that the
deferred annuity payments start.93 There is some risk of running out of
money before the year that the deferred annuity starts, but that risk is
certainly more manageable than trying to manage one’s retirement savings
over the indefinite future.94
4. Other Lifetime Income Products
Retirees can also choose to purchase variable annuities with guaranteed
lifetime withdrawal benefit (GLWB) funds to manage their longevity risk.95
92 E-mail from Hersh Stern, WebAnnuities Ins. Agency, Inc., to Jonathan Barry Forman
(Feb. 7, 2012, 11:46 EST) (on file with authors). Alternatively, that 65-year-old man could have
purchased a deferred annuity that starts at age 80 and pays $17,069.40 per year; at age 75 and pays
$11,649.84 per year; or at age 70 and pays $8133.60 per year. Id. Companies do not offer inflationadjusted deferred annuities, but some companies do offer fixed step-ups. Joseph A. Tomlinson,
Income Choices, FIN. PLAN. (May 1, 2011), http://www.financial-planning.com/fp_issues/2011_5/
income-choices-2672801-1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/U35E-EXKR (comparing various
investment strategies including systematic withdrawals, immediate annuities, deferred annuities,
and guaranteed lifetime withdrawal benefits).
93 See, e.g., Stephen C. Sexauer, Michael W. Peskin & Daniel Cassidy, Making Retirement
Income Last a Lifetime, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.–Feb. 2012, at 76-77 (proposing a “decumulation
benchmark” that would use about 88% of retiree savings to purchase a laddered portfolio of
Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities [TIPS] for the first 20 years and a deferred life annuity
purchased with the remaining 12%); Rick Wurster, DC 20/20: Pathways to a Secure Retirement,
ROTMAN INT’ L J. PENSION MGMT., Fall 2011, at 54, 58 (suggesting that an annuity providing
35% of real income replacement from age 85 would cost about 7.5% of a participant’s average
account balance at retirement).
94 Finally, it is worth noting that workers might be able to buy deferred annuities in
installments, starting at a young age. For example, a worker could use a portion of her retirement
savings each year to purchase a deferred annuity that starts at age 65, or at the advanced ages of 70,
75, 80, 85, or even 90. Accordingly, this type of deferred annuity product could be used to provide
retirement benefits that mimic the lifetime pensions provided by traditional defined benefit plans.
See Moshe A. Milevsky, Real Longevity Insurance with a Deductible: Introduction to Advanced-Life
Delayed Annuities (ALDA), N. AM. ACTUARIAL J., Oct. 2005, at 109, 111 (“[T]he [Advanced-Life
Delayed Annuity] is preferable to a pure endowment policy that would (mature and) pay a lump
sum at age 80, 85, or 90 since it would continue to provide periodic lifetime income regardless of
how long the annuitant lived beyond the endowed age.”); see also Zorast Wadia, Longevity Risk &
Retirement, ACTUARIAL DIG., Spring 2012, at 4, available at http://publications.milliman.com/
publications/eb-published/pdfs/longevity-risk-and-retirement.pdf (proposing a new retirement
paradigm combining aspects of a defined benefit plan and a defined contribution plan).
95 See Moshe A. Milevsky & Ling-wu Shao, Annuities and Their Derivatives: The Recent
Canadian Experience (“[GLWB funds] provide savers with (some of) the retirement longevity
protection of a traditional annuity, without forcing them to surrender upside potential or
liquidity.”), in SECURING LIFELONG RETIREMENT INCOME: GLOBAL ANNUITY M ARKETS
AND POLICY 50, 56 (Olivia S. Mitchell, John Piggott & Noriyuki Takayama eds., 2011).
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A GLWB is based on a variable annuity, but it allows investors to lock in a
minimum guarantee for life.96 Similarly, so-called “standalone living
benefits” are like GLWBs, except that instead of using a variable annuity
chassis, standalone living benefits use mutual funds or managed accounts as
the base.97
II. TONTINE PENSIONS
After analyzing the tontine principle, this Part discusses how to design a
tontine fund, a tontine annuity, and finally, a tontine pension.
A. The Tontine Principle
In a simple tontine, members contribute equally to buy a portfolio of
investments that is awarded entirely to the last surviving member.98
Alternatively, each time a member of a tontine pool dies, her account
balance could be divided among the surviving members of the pool.99 The
latter type of tontine could be used to develop new financial products that
would provide reliable, pension-like income for retirees. The key point is
that variations on the tontine principle—that the share of each, at death, is
enjoyed by the survivors—can be used to create a variety of attractive
retirement income financial products.100
At the outset, imagine that 1000 65-year-old retirees each contribute
$1000 to an investment fund that purchases a $1,000,000 Treasury bond
paying 4% interest coupons.101 The bond will generate $40,000 in interest
96 Mechanically, the investor or retiree deposits or rolls over a sum of money into a variable
annuity with sub-accounts that are invested in a portfolio of stocks, bonds, and other generic
investments. Depending on market performance, that investment portfolio grows or shrinks. In
any event, at retirement, the annuitant begins taking guaranteed withdrawals from the account.
Payouts come from the invested funds, but if those funds are ever depleted due to long life or poor
investment returns, the guaranteed minimum kicks in. On the other hand, if the investment
portfolio performs well, payouts can be increased. Tomlinson, supra note 92.
97 Id.
98 COOPER, supra note 9, at 1-2.
99 Id.
100 See, e.g., Ralph Goldsticker, A Mutual Fund to Yield Annuity-Like Benefits, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
Jan.–Feb. 2007, at 63, 65 (describing alternative tontine structures, such as the pooling of assets
from multiple tontine cohorts, investing assets in variable-income securities, and establishing
inflation-adjusted payouts); Paul Newfield, The Tontine: An Improvement on the Conventional
Annuity?, J. RETIREMENT, Winter 2014, at 37, 42 (delineating the advantages of tontines, or
“pooled survival funds,” over traditional annuities, which include the lack of a contingency reserve
requirement and a higher expected return).
101 This example is derived from Moshe A. Milevsky, Want Financial Security? Look to the
Renaissance, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732453
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per year, which will be split equally among the surviving participants. A
custodian holds the bond and, because the custodian takes no risk and
requires no capital, the custodian charges a trivial fee. Assuming that all of
the investors live through the first year, they will each receive a $40 dividend
from the fund ($40 = $40,000/1000). If only 800 of the original investors are
alive a decade after the tontine started (when the survivors are 75), then
each will receive a $50 dividend ($50 = $40,000/800). If only 100 investors
are alive two decades after that (when the survivors are 95), then each will
receive a $400 dividend ($400 = $40,000/100). Later, when only 40 investors
remain, each will receive a $1000 dividend ($1000 = $40,000/40). If the terms
of the tontine call for liquidation at that point, then each of the 40 survivors
would also receive a liquidating distribution of $25,000 ($25,000 =
$1,000,000/40). Alternatively, the tontine could be designed so that the last
survivor receives the entire $1,000,000.
Most retirees would likely prefer to have reasonably level benefits
throughout their retirement years, rather than benefits that increase sharply
at the very end of their lives. Accordingly, it would make sense to design
tontine financial products with benefits that are level throughout retirement
(like an immediate, level-payment annuity) or, alternatively, that increase
gradually throughout retirement (like an immediate, inflation-adjusted
annuity). Of particular note, unlike these commercial annuities—which
must support insurance agent commissions and insurance company reserves,
risk-taking, and profits—an early death in a tontine benefits only other
investors, not some opportunistic insurance company. This limitation of
benefits to investors should make tontines very popular.102
B. A Tontine Fund
Before explaining how the tontine principle can be used to create a
tontine pension, this Section shows how the tontine principle can be used to

2004578358110813542442.html?mod=ITP_journalreport_1, archived at http://perma.cc/RF7H5FU8.
102 For example, Professor Suzanne Shu suggests that a tontine for one’s fellow firefighters
will be perceived as fairer than the typical commercial annuity that they could buy from an
insurance company: with a commercial annuity, an early death seems to benefit the insurance
company, but with a tontine, an early death benefits fellow firefighters. SHLOMO BENARTZI,
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE POST-RETIREMENT CRISIS: A RESPONSE TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY/DEPARTMENT OF LABOR REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
REGARDING LIFETIME INCOME OPTIONS FOR PARTICIPANTS AND BENEFICIARIES IN
RETIREMENT P LANS 15 (2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1210-AB33-617.pdf.
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create a tontine fund. The next Section explains how to create a tontine
annuity.103
We have already shown how a tontine fund could work for a group of 65year-old investors who all invested the same amount (i.e., $1000).104 This
Section shows how to create a tontine fund that is fair to all investors,
regardless of their age, gender, or the amount of their investments.
In a simple tontine, when a member dies, the balance in her account
(i.e., her contribution plus investment earnings) is distributed to the
surviving members of the pool as “mortality gains.”105 Those forfeitures are
divided equally among the survivors. Unfortunately, that approach results in
an unfair situation because it favors younger members who are likely to live
longer and receive more distributions.
In a tontine fund with participants who have different ages, genders, and
investment levels, the surviving members should not get equal portions of a
dying member’s balance. Instead, the distributions should be made in
unequal portions, carefully chosen to provide fair bets for all investors. In
short, a tontine fund should be governed by a “fair transfer–plan” that
accounts for each member’s life expectancy (i.e., death probability) and
investment level.106 In this Section, we describe how such a tontine fund
would be designed.
1. A Fair Transfer–plan
We can design a fair transfer–plan (FTP) to build a tontine fund that
provides fair bets for all investors. The concept is straightforward: members
join the tontine fund by contributing a desired amount, and each time a
member dies, her contribution (and investment earnings) is distributed to
the surviving members according to the FTP. New members may join at
any time by making a contribution of a desired amount; however, no

103 For background on tontine annuities, see, for example, Goldsticker, supra note 100;
Milevsky & Salisbury, supra note 1; Michael J. Sabin, A Fast Bipartite Algorithm for Fair Tontines
(May 22, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1848737; Sabin,
supra note 15.
104 See supra text accompanying note 101.
105 Individuals who invest in annuity-like products have mortality gains and losses depending
on when they die. Individuals who live longer than their peers get mortality gains from those who
precede them, while individuals who die earlier than their peers suffer mortality losses. See David
Blake, Annuity Markets: Problems and Solutions, 24 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 358, 371 (1999)
(explaining that a mortality cross-subsidy “arises because some annuitants will die shortly after
taking out an annuity thereby releasing a ‘mortality profit’ which insurance companies share with
longer-surviving annuitants”).
106 The term “fair transfer–plan” is derived from Sabin, supra note 15, at 5.
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member may ever withdraw her contributions (or investment earnings).107
Structured in this way, a tontine fund could operate into perpetuity.
a. Tontine Funds Can Be Fair to Members of Different Ages
Tontine funds can easily be designed to be fair to members of different
ages. For example, Table 1 illustrates a tontine fund with just four members
of different ages. To keep this example as simple as possible, we assume that
each member (i) has contributed $1000 to the fund and that these
contributions do not earn any interest.108 We use unisex life tables rather
than gender-based life tables.109 For example, member 4 in Table 1 is an 80year-old who has a life expectancy (ei) of 8.95 years, and a 5.2% chance of
dying before reaching age 81 (i.e., a death probability (qi) of 0.051906).
Table 1: A Tontine Fund with Four Members of Different Ages, Unisex110
Member
(i)

Age
(xi)

Life
Expectancy
(years)
(ei)

Death
Probability
(qi)

Force-ofMortality
Probability
(fi)

Fair
Transfer–
plan Weight
(wi)

1
2
3
4

65
70
75
80

18.88
15.22
11.89
8.95

0.013181
0.020314
0.032111
0.051906

0.013269
0.020523
0.032638
0.053302

0.053815
0.086183
0.146795
0.713207

Table 1 also shows a parameter known as the force-of-mortality probability
( fi). Here is the logic: suppose that at time t a member of the pool dies.
Pretend that we do not know which member has died at time t. The forceof-mortality probabilities indicate the relative probability of death for each
member of the pool. If, at the instant that a member died, one member has
a force-of-mortality probability with a value f, and another has a value 2f,
then the second member is twice as likely as the first to be the one who
107

The situation is identical to a commercial annuity: once the premium is paid, there is no

refund.
108 That is, the underlying investments do not pay interest or dividends, nor are there any
sales that result in gains or losses. We relax this assumption later in the paper. See infra subsection
II.B.1.d.
109 The life expectancies (ei) and death probabilities (qi) in Table 1 are derived from data
provided to the authors by the Social Security Administration. E-mail from K. Mark Bye, Soc.
Sec. Admin., to Jonathan Barry Forman (Nov. 12, 2013, 14:31 EST) (on file with authors). See infra
Appendix Table 1 for a fuller version of the Social Security Administration 2009 unisex life table.
110 Table 1 is drawn from Bye, supra note 109, and the authors’ computations.

778

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 755

died. In Table 1, for example, member 4 (our 80-year-old) has a relatively
large force-of-mortality probability (0.053302), while member 1 (our 65year-old) has a relatively small force-of-mortality probability (0.013269). In
short, member 4 is clearly the member who is the more likely of the two to
have died at time t. Indeed, of the four members in Table 1, member 4 is the
most likely to die next. These force-of-mortality probabilities (f i ) are
relatively easy to compute from the death probabilities (qi) in a mortality
table.111
Table 1 also shows another parameter, referred to as the “fair transfer–
plan weight” (wi). When a member of a tontine fund dies, she forfeits her
entire contribution. Her contribution is then divided among the surviving
members, with each surviving member receiving some fraction of the
decedent’s account. For example, if member 4 (the 80-year-old) is, in fact,
the member who died next, her $1000 contribution would be distributed to
members 1, 2, and 3 based on their respective fair transfer–plan weights
(wi). These fair transfer–plan weights (wi) are relatively easy to compute
from the force-of-mortality probabilities ( fi).112
111 The force-of-mortality probabilities in Table 1 were computed from the death probabilities
(qi) in Column 4 of that table. See Sabin, supra note 15, at 10-12 (demonstrating how the force-ofmortality method is interpolated from the probability of death during a given year).
The explanation is as follows: at the outset, we make the simplifying assumption that the
force of mortality is constant during each year of age. Next, suppose that the probability of dying
during a specific year of age is 5%. Then, the probability of surviving the year is 1 - 0.05 = 95%.
Now suppose the probability of surviving the first 6 months is 1 - 0.05/2 = 97.5%, and the
probability of surviving the second 6 months is the same. Then, the probability of surviving the
year is (0.975)2 = 95.063%. Now suppose the probability of surviving the first month is 1 - 0.05/12,
and the same for the second month, third month, etc. Then, the probability of surviving the year is
(1 - 0.05/12)12 = 95.113%. Generalizing this math, if the probability of surviving each of n periods
within the year is 1 - 0.05/n, then the probability of surviving the year is (1 - 0.05/n)n. As n grows
to infinity, the probability of surviving the year becomes e-.05= 95.123%, where e is Euler’s number
(~2.71828). The probability of dying sometime during the year (i.e., the death probability) is 1 0.95123 = 4.877%, and the force-of-mortality probability is 5%.
Now, let us work it in reverse. Suppose the mortality table says that the death probability
during a specific year is 5%. What is the force-of-mortality probability for the year? It is the value
x that satisfies e-x = 1 - 0.05. The solution is x = -ln(1 - .05) = 5.129%, where “ln” is the natural
logarithm.
Accordingly, the force-of-mortality probabilities in Table 1 were computed from the death
probabilities in Table 1 by using the formula, fi = -ln(1 - qi ). For example, for member 4, f4 = -ln(1
- q4 ) = -ln(1 - 0.051906) = 0.053302. Of note, the force-of-mortality probabilities are fairly close in
value to the death probabilities, except at older ages. See infra Appendix Table 1 (showing how the
values in Columns 3 and 4 diverge as individuals live beyond age 100).
112 The explanation is as follows: our goal is to design a fair transfer–plan, one that provides
fair bets to all of the members. This means we want the expected return (ERi) received by each
member i to be zero. Mathematically, we want

0 = -fi si + ∑ j≠i fj sjwi/(1-wj ) for each member i,
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More specifically, if member j dies, each surviving member i would
receive some fraction of j’s $1000 contribution: the fraction that each
member i would receive of member j’s contribution (sj) is equal to
wi/(1 - wj), for i ≠ j. The fair transfer–plan weights (wi) are positive values
that sum to 1, so the denominator (1 - wj) is the sum of all fair transfer–plan
weights (wi) except that of member j. Meanwhile, member j would forfeit
her entire $1000 contribution.
Finally, we can use the fair transfer–plan weights to determine the
amounts that each member i would receive when member j dies. For
example, if member 4 (the 80-year-old) dies, then member 1 (the 65-yearold) would receive $187.64 = $1000 × w1/(1 - w4) = $1000 × 0.053815/(1 0.713207); member 2 (the 70-year-old) would receive $300.51 = $1000 × w2/(1
- w4) = $1000 × 0.086183/(1 - 0.713207); member 3 (the 75-year-old) would
receive $511.85 = $1000 × w3/(1 - w4) = $1000 × 0.146795/(1 - 0.713207); and, of
course, member 4 would forfeit her $1000.113 We call the distributions to
members 1, 2, and 3 “mortality-gain distributions”; meanwhile, member 4
has a mortality loss.114

where: fi is the force-of-mortality probability of member i, si is the contribution made by member
i, and wi is the fair transfer–plan weight for member i that we need to provide fair bets. See Sabin,
A Fast Bipartite Algorithm for Fair Tontines, supra note 103, at 7-8 (explaining the underlying
algorithm).
The formula above gives us a set of m equations, one equation for each member i. The
solution to those equations is unique, meaning there is only one set of fair transfer–plan weights
(wi) that solve those equations. The challenging part is that the equations are not linear because, in
each equation, one unknown, wi, is divided by another unknown, (1 - wj). That means we cannot
solve the equations using the standard methods of linear algebra. Fortunately, however, we are able
to solve these equations by using an iterative method designed specifically for them. More
specifically, the iterative method uses a bisection algorithm. See id. at 12-13 (demonstrating the
bisection algorithm method). While the explanation of how to create the computer program to
solve that algorithm is too involved to explain here, we can easily show that the method works, as
the fair transfer–plan weights (wi) in Table 1 do solve the pertinent equations. For example, for i =
3, ER3 = 0:
- 0.032638 × $1000= -32.638
+ 0.013269 × $1000 × 0.146795/(1 - 0.053815)= 2.059
+ 0.020523 × $1000 × 0.146795/(1 - 0.086183)= 3.297
+ 0.053302 × $1000 × 0.146795/(1 - 0.713207)= 27.283
=0
We can verify that similar equations for i = 1, 2, and 4 also work. Therefore, we can be certain that
the fair transfer–plan weights (wi) in Table 1 accomplish our goal for a fair transfer–plan (i.e., ERi
= 0).
113 Checking our answer, $187.64 + $300.51 + $511.85 = $1000.
114 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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In short, a tontine fund can fairly accommodate members of different
ages. The key is to design a fair transfer–plan that uses each member’s
death probability (qi) to determine her force-of-mortality probability ( fi)
and her fair transfer–plan weight (wi). The result is a tontine investment
fund that offers a fair bet to all members. It is worth noting that the iterative method used to determine the fair transfer–plan weights (wi) is fast and
could easily handle large tontine funds involving millions of members.
b. Tontine Funds Can Be Fair to Both Men and Women
Tontines can also be designed to take gender into account.115 Women
tend to live longer than men and have lower death probabilities than sameaged men.116 For example, Table 2 shows that the life expectancy (ei) for a
65-year-old man in 2009 was 17.51 years, and his death probability (qi) was
0.016182; meanwhile, the life expectancy (ei) of a 65-year-old woman that
year was 20.19 years and her death probability (qi) was 0.010298.117 Compare
those numbers with their 18.88-year unisex life expectancy (ei) and their
0.013181 unisex death probability (qi) shown in Table 1.
Table 2: A Tontine Fund with Four Members, Gender-Based118
Member Age Gender
Life
(i)
(xi)
Expectancy
(years)
(ei)
1
2
3
4

65
65
65
65

male
male
female
female

17.51
17.51
20.19
20.19

Death
Probability
(qi)

Force-ofMortality
Probability
(fi)

Fair Transfer–plan
Weight
(wi)

0.016182
0.016182
0.010298
0.010298

0.016314
0.016314
0.010351
0.010351

0.330931
0.330931
0.169069
0.169069

A tontine fund can take gender into account by using gender-based
death probabilities (qi) rather than unisex death probabilities. For example,
Table 2 illustrates a tontine fund with two men and two women. For
simplicity, we assume that all the members of this tontine fund are age 65,
115 See, e.g., Sabin, supra note 15, at 14-16 (providing an example of a tontine that could be fair
regardless of the participants’ gender).
116 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 21.
117 The life expectancies (ei) and death probabilities (qi) in Table 2 are derived from data
provided to the authors by the Social Security Administration. E-mail from K. Mark Bye, Soc.
Sec. Admin., to Jonathan Barry Forman (Dec. 3, 2014, 10:03 EST) (on file with authors).
118 Table 2 is drawn from Bye, supra note 117, and the authors’ computations.
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that each contributed $1000 to the fund, and that their contributions do not
earn any interest. However, as the previous subsection showed, a tontine
fund could easily accommodate members of different ages, as well.
Assuming that member 4 (a female) dies, then members 1 and 2 (the
males) would each receive a mortality-gain distribution of $398.27 ($398.27 =
$1000 × w1(or 2)/(1 - w4) = $1000 × 0.330931/(1 - 0.169069)); member 3 (the
other female) would receive a mortality-gain distribution of just $203.47
($203.47 = $1000 × w3/(1 - w4) = $1000 × 0.169069/(1 - 0.169069)); and, of
course, member 4 would forfeit her $1000 balance (a mortality loss of
$1000).119 On the other hand, if these mortality-gain distributions had
instead been determined under a unisex mortality table, it is easy to see that
when one member dies each survivor would get one-third, $333.33 ($333.33 =
$1000 × wi/(1 - wj) = $1000 × 0.25/(1 - 0.25)). Based on this comparison, the
female members would appear to be short-changed if a tontine fund used a
gender-based life expectancy table; however, remember that the 65-year-old
females in any tontine fund are likely to live longer and receive more
mortality-gain distributions than their 65-year-old brethren. All in all, the
expected returns for both men and women would be equal, and both
genders would get fair returns on their $1000 investments (i.e., fair bets).120
Implicitly, since gender-based tontine funds would be fair to both women
and men, unisex tontine funds must be “unfair” to one gender. In fact,
unisex tontine funds would be unfair to men in precisely the same way that
unisex commercial annuities are “unfair” to men: the annual distributions
would be identical for men and women with a unisex tontine fund (or
unisex annuity), but women tend to live longer and would likely collect
more money from unisex tontine funds (and unisex annuities) than men.
The bottom line is that women would generally fare better than men in any
tontine fund that used unisex life tables. Accordingly, to attract both male
and female investors, the free market would force tontine funds to take
gender into account in their design (i.e., use gender-based, not unisex, life
tables), just as the free market today already forces insurance companies to
take gender into account when they sell annuities.121
In short, a tontine fund can fairly accommodate members of different
genders by using gender-based life tables rather than unisex life tables.
119
120
121

Checking our answer, $398.27 + $398.27 + $203.47 = $1000.01 (error due to rounding).
That is, ERi = 0 for both women and men.
See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. We have much more to say about gender
issues later in this Article. See infra Section V.D; see also Mary L. Heen, Nondiscrimination in
Insurance: The Next Chapter, 49 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 61) (on file with
University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (arguing that gender discrimination laws should be
expanded to prevent insurance companies from selling gender-based annuities).
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c. Tontines Can Fairly Accommodate Members with Differing Levels of Contribution
Tontine funds can also allow members to make differing levels of
contributions. For example, Table 3 illustrates a tontine fund with four
members with different contribution levels (si). For simplicity, all of the
members of this tontine fund are 65-year-old men (and contributions do not
earn any interest), although as the previous subsections have shown, a
tontine fund can easily accommodate members of different ages and
genders.
Table 3: A Tontine Fund with Four Members, Different Levels of Contribution122
Member
(i)

Age
(xi )

Contribution
(si )

Life
Expectancy
(years)
(ei )

Death
Probability
(qi )

Force-ofMortality
Probability
( fi )

Fair Transfer–
plan Weight
(wi )

1
2
3
4

65
65
65
65

$1000
$2000
$3000
$4000

17.51
17.51
17.51
17.51

0.016182
0.016182
0.016182
0.016182

0.016314
0.016314
0.016314
0.016314

0.066510
0.145278
0.247530
0.540682

Mathematically, if the dying member is member j, then each surviving
member i would receive a mortality-gain distribution equal to sjwi/(1 - wj),
for i ≠ j. For example, assuming that member 4 (the $4000 contributor) dies,
then member 1 (the $1000 contributor) would receive a mortality-gain
distribution of $579.21 ($579.21 = s4w1/(1 - w4) = $4000 × 0.06651/(1 0.540682)); member 2 (the $2,000 contributor) would receive a mortalitygain distribution of $1265.16 ($1265.16 = s4w2/(1 - w4) = $4000 × 0.145278/(1 0.540682)); member 3 (the $3000 contributor) would receive a mortalitygain distribution of $2155.63 ($2155.63 = s4w3/(1 - w4) = $4000 × 0.247530/(1 0.540682)); and, of course, member 4 would forfeit his $4000 balance (a
mortality loss of $ 4000).123
122
123

Table 3 is drawn from Bye, supra note 117, and authors’ computations.
Checking our answer, $579.21 + $1265.16 + $2155.63 = $4000.
Intuitively, some readers may be wondering why, for example, member 2 (the $2000 contributor)
would get more than twice as much as member 1 (the $1000 contributor). Asked differently, some
readers may be wondering why member 2’s fair transfer–plan weight (w2), 0.145278, would be more
than twice as much as member 1’s fair transfer–plan weight (w1), 0.066510.
Here, a slightly different example can help. Imagine a tontine fund with four otherwise
identical 65-year-old men, except that while members 1, 2, and 3 each contribute $1000 to the
tontine fund, member 4 contributes $3000. Now assume that member 1 dies, leaving members 2, 3,
and 4 alive. Intuitively, it might seem that member 1’s $1000 contribution should be divided in
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A tontine fund can fairly accommodate members with differing levels of
contributions by using fair transfer–plan weights (wi) that take into account
those different levels of contributions. There is one caveat, however: no one
member can own more than half of the total risk of a tontine fund.
Otherwise, the tontine fund could not provide that person with a fair bet
for surviving the rest.124
d. Tontine Funds Can Properly Account for Investment Earnings
In the simple tontine funds that we have considered so far, we have
assumed that contributions do not earn any interest. In the real world,
however, each member’s contributions would be invested, and each
member’s balance would grow (or shrink) according to its investment
performance. As members of a tontine fund die, mortality-gain distributions are based on the balance in each member’s account at the time of
death.
We continue to use the variable si (which we have used so far only to
signify member contributions) to denote the balance in member i’s account
at any time t; and, again, if the dying member is member j, then each
surviving member i would receive a mortality-gain distribution equal to
sjwi/(1 - wj), for i ≠ j. If the pool of tontine fund investors is large, then the
deaths of members would occur relatively often, and each survivor would
receive frequent payments of mortality-gain distributions that would
continue until her own death.

proportion to the relative contributions (si) of members 2, 3, and 4, in which case member 2 (s2 =
$1000) and member 3 (s3 = $1000) would each get $200, one-fifth of dying member 1’s $1000
contribution ($200 = $1000 × $1000/($1000 + $1000 + $3000)), while member 4 (s4 = $3000) would
get $600, or three-fifths ($600 = $1000 × $3000/($1000 + $1000 + $3000)). In fact, however, member
4 must get 100% of dying member 1’s contribution, and he must also get 100% of member 2’s
contribution or 100% of member 3’s contribution if either of them is the one who dies. Otherwise,
member 4’s expected return from the investment would be less than zero. After all, if member 4
dies, he will lose his entire $3000 contribution; therefore, in effect, he must get 100% of the
contributions of any other member who dies.
In short, all other things being equal, members who make larger contributions to a tontine
fund must get disproportionately higher mortality-gain distributions from the fund in order to
receive a fair bet. The fair transfer–plan weights (wi) do the work. That is why, in Table 3, member
2’s fair transfer–plan weight (s2 = $2000; w2 = 0.145278), is more than twice as much as member 1’s
fair transfer–plan weight (s1 = $1000; w1 = 0.066510).
124 Here, a member’s risk means the product fi si of his force-of-mortality probability ( fi)
multiplied by his contribution (si), and the total risk means the sum of all members’ risks. See
Sabin, supra note 15, at 14 (“[A]n FTP exists if and only if no member holds more than half of the
total risk of the pool.”). Additional rules may be imposed that limit the total amount that a
member may contribute. Id.
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Again, no member would ever be allowed to take any other distributions
(i.e., no voluntary withdrawals).125 Once a contribution is made, it would
remain in the tontine fund forever, along with any investment earnings. At
the member’s death, the balance in the account would be distributed to the
surviving members as mortality-gain distributions. This restriction is
necessary because a member in failing health would otherwise seek to
withdraw her contributions and the earnings on those contributions. Such
“adverse selection” would invalidate the assumptions of the mortality table
used to compute the fair transfer–plan weights (wi).
e. Tontine Funds Could Also Take Increasing Longevity into Account
Finally, in the simple tontine funds we have considered so far, we have
used the Social Security Administration’s 2009 life tables.126 Over time,
however, life expectancies are likely to increase, and these 2009 life tables
will soon be out-of-date.127 Consequently, a real-world tontine fund should
be designed to use the latest life tables so that it can make mortality-gain
distributions based on the most recent death probability estimates.128
2. Expected Benefits of Tontine Funds
We have shown the ease of designing a tontine fund that is fair to
members of differing ages, genders, and contribution levels. To be sure,
those who survive the longest would get better than average returns (i.e.,
mortality gains), while those who die young might not even recover their
initial investments (i.e., mortality losses). On average, however, each
member could expect to recover her initial contribution and any returns on
that investment (less a modest management and recordkeeping fee).
Figure 1 shows a computer simulation of how a tontine fund with
around 220 members might work.129 This simulation was designed by
creating a tontine fund in which one new member joins each month. Each
125
126

See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
See supra Tables 1 & 2 (using the Social Security Administration’s 2009 unisex and
gender-based life tables, respectively).
127 FELICITIE C. B ELL & MICHAEL L. MILLER, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., L IFE TABLES FOR
THE UNITED S TATES SOCIAL SECURITY AREA 1900-2100, at 14 fig.4a (2005), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/pdf_studies/study120.pdf; Jonathan Barry Forman & Yung-Ping
(Bing) Chen, Optimal Retirement Age, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF BENEFITS AND
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION § 14.02 (2008) (outlining the effect of increased life expectancy on
current pension plans).
128 As a legal matter, the tontine fund agreement would need to specify how and when it
would choose a new life table for use in its fair transfer–plan.
129 See Sabin, supra note 15, at 24-25 (illustrating such a simulation).
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new member’s gender was randomly selected, equiprobably male or female;
each new member’s age was exactly 65; that is, his or her 65th birthday
coincided with the joining date; and each member’s contribution was a
randomly selected amount between $100 and $100,000. The number of
members grows for several decades until it reaches an equilibrium of about
220 members, where, on average, one member dies each month, offsetting
the new member who joins each month. Figure 1 shows the mortality gains
that a typical long-lived male could expect after that equilibrium has been
reached.

Figure 1: Normalized Mortality Gain from FTPs Versus Age for a Typical
Long-Lived Male Member in a Simulated Tontine Fund130

More specifically, Figure 1 plots the mortality-gain distributions paid to
one of the longer-lived male members in the simulation (normalized to a
contribution of $1). The plot began at the member’s joining age, age 65, and
130

Id. at 25 fig. 5.
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ended at the time of his death. As the plot shows, benefits would be
received at random times (i.e., when other members died) and in random
amounts (i.e., varying with the contributions of the dying member). The
average value of his benefit would increase with age, since the member’s
own death probability (qi) and, consequently, his fair transfer–plan weight
(wi) would increase with his age. In fact, it can be shown that the average
value of a tontine fund member’s benefit depends only on that member’s age
and gender (for qi) and that member’s contribution (si): the ages, genders,
and contribution amounts of other members do not affect that member’s
average benefit.131
3. Two Problems with Tontine Funds
Two features of the tontine fund in Figure 1 stand out as serious
negatives. First, mortality-gain distributions vary dramatically both in
amount and timing, because they depend on when members die and how
much those dying members had contributed. In short, payouts are noisy.
Second, a member’s mortality-gain distributions start slow and low but
increase rather dramatically at advanced ages, as the member’s death
probability (qi) increases with age. In short, payouts are backloaded.
While the tontine fund always provides a fair bet to investors, these two
disadvantages will discourage retirees from investing in them because,
presumably, most retirees would prefer to have benefits that are level
throughout retirement (like an immediate, level-payment annuity) or,
alternatively, that increase gradually throughout retirement (like an
immediate, inflation-adjusted annuity).
a. Reducing the Noisiness of a Tontine Fund
The noisiness of a tontine fund can be reduced by accumulating mortalitygain distributions over some period (e.g., a month), rather than paying
them at the time of each member’s death, and by increasing the number of
investors in the tontine fund. First, for example, a tontine fund can be
designed to make monthly mortality-gain distributions as follows:


Each member has an individual account that holds his contribution;

131 See id. at 5 (noting that, in a fair tontine, “a surviving member’s expected payout does not
depend on the number of members in the pool, or the ages, genders, or contributions of the other
members”).
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When a member dies, the balance in his account is distributed
to the accounts of the surviving members based on their respective fair transfer–plan weights (wi); and



At end of each month, each living member receives a monthly
mortality-gain distribution equal to the excess of the balance in his
account over the amount of his initial contribution.
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Second, increasing the number of members in a tontine fund would
further decrease the noisiness of payouts. For example, imagine a tontine
fund with approximately 5000 members of varying ages and genders who
have made varying contributions. Again, for simplicity, assume that contributions do not earn interest. Table 4 shows a sample monthly statement for
a member who had contributed $250,000 to a tontine fund and who lived
through the month. More specifically, Table 4 shows that this member
received a single distribution of $1041.67 at the end of the month, rather
than varying amounts throughout the month (ranging from a low of $0 on
most days to a high of $184.32 on April 7).132 In short, the noisiness of this
tontine fund would be reduced through (1) making monthly mortality-gain
distributions (rather than as each death occurs) and (2) having a large
number of members in the pool (approximately 5000).

132 In this example, two other members died on April 7, and this hypothetical member had
$184.32 credited to her account ($184.32 = $135.41 + $48.91).

788

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 755

Table 4: Sample Monthly Tontine Fund Statement for a Living Member133

Date
03/31
04/02
04/03
04/05
04/07
04/07
04/12
04/15
04/20
04/21
04/22
04/25
04/28
04/30
04/30

Amount ($)
67.17
25.21
55.14
135.41
48.91
52.29
102.54
159.46
139.68
17.82
124.81
55.32
57.91
(1041.67)

Balance ($)
250,000.00
250,067.17
250,092.38
250,147.52
250,282.93
250,331.84
250,384.13
250,486.67
250,649.13
250,785.82
250,803.63
250,928.44
250,983.76
251,041.67
250,000.00

Description
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Payout of FTP Proceeds

In contrast, Table 5 shows the sample monthly statement for another
member who is the same age and gender and contributed the same amount
as the member in Table 4 but who died during the month. When she died
on April 12, she forfeited the balance in her account on that date, and it was
divided among the surviving members of the tontine fund (i.e., with the
surviving member in Table 4 receiving $52.29 of the account on that
date).134

133 This hypothetical tontine fund has approximately 5000 members of varying ages and
genders who have made varying contributions. Mortality gains are based on a fair transfer–plan,
and surviving members get a single payout at the end of the month.
134 In the real world, it would certainly take some time for the tontine fund manager to
discover and record deaths and to compute the resulting mortality gains. Accordingly, actual
monthly mortality-gain distributions might be delayed for a month or two. It would be more
accurate to say that the surviving member in Table 4 is entitled to, and will eventually receive, the
$52.29 attributable to the April 12th death of the member whose account is shown in Table 5.
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Table 5: Sample Monthly Tontine Fund Statement for a Member Who Dies
During the Month135

Date

Amount($)

Balance ($)

Description

03/31
04/02
67.17
04/03
25.21
04/05
55.14
04/07
135.41
04/07
48.91
04/12 (250,331.84)

250,000.00
250,067.17
250,092.38
250,147.52
250,282.93
250,331.84
0

Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Forfeited to FTP

Unfortunately, accumulating mortality-gains for monthly mortality-gain
distributions and increasing the number of members in the tontine fund
would do nothing to counteract the volatility that would invariably result
from fluctuations in the value of the underlying investment assets. For
example, if all of the tontine fund assets were invested in equities, then
average monthly mortality-gain distributions could fall from, for example,
$1000 a month for a typical member when the Dow Jones Industrial Average
hit 14,000 (i.e., in October of 2007) to just $500 a month when the Dow
Jones Industrial Average fell to 7000 (i.e., in February of 2009).136
To be sure, market fluctuations also play havoc with the prices and yields
of traditional annuities and variable annuities that could be purchased by a
retiree or by a pension plan. For example, if the market is down when a
retiree decides to buy an annuity, she will only be able to buy a smaller
annuity. Similarly, if interest rates are low when she decides to buy an
annuity, the lifetime income stream that she purchases will also be low.137
Variable annuity payouts also vary with the performance of the underlying
assets.138

135 This hypothetical tontine fund has approximately 5000 members of varying ages and
genders who have made varying contributions. Mortality gains are based on a fair transfer–plan,
surviving members get a single payout at the end of the month, and dying members forfeit the
balance in their accounts on the date of death.
136 Dow Jones Industrial Average, supra note 54. Monthly mortality-gain distributions would
also fluctuate with changes in the dividend and interest yields on the underlying assets.
137 The Dangers of Buying an Annuity When Interest Rates Are Low, supra note 55.
138 See Marotta, supra note 56 and accompanying text. We will further discuss how tontine
financial products can help investors deal with market volatility in Section V.C, infra.
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b. Reducing Backloading in a Tontine Fund
Unfortunately, it is impossible to reduce the backloading that is inherent
in a tontine fund. The longer a member lives, the more she would recieve, as
her monthly mortality-gain distributions would generally increase with her
age and her increasing death probability (qi).139 In the next Section,
however, we will discuss how this backloading problem can be solved by
adding an “annuity-payback mechanism.” The annuity-payback mechanism
has the added benefit of further reducing the noisiness of the payouts. We
call the resulting product a “tontine annuity.”
C. A Tontine Annuity
In this Section, we propose a tontine annuity that closely resembles a
variable annuity. A tontine annuity is constructed by adding two
enhancements to a tontine fund. First, as already discussed, to reduce
noisiness, we would build in a monthly payment period; and, second, to
eliminate backloading, we would add an annuity-payback mechanism.
1. Monthly Accrual of Fair Transfer–plan Payouts
In a tontine annuity, mortality-gain distributions would not be paid out
immediately when other members die. Instead, mortality-gain distributions
would be accrued within the individual accounts of the surviving members.
If a member is alive at the end of the month, she would be paid the accrued
mortality-gain distributions in her account as a monthly mortality-gain
distribution (e.g., see Table 4). If she is not alive at the end of the month,
she would receive nothing, as the balance in her account, including any
mortality-gain distributions that accrued that month, would have been
distributed to surviving members when she died during the month (e.g., see
Table 5). Thus, a member would receive payments on a monthly schedule
just as she would if she had instead purchased a variable annuity from an
insurance company.
2. Annuity Payback
In addition to receiving a monthly mortality-gain distribution, each
surviving member would also receive a portion of her original contribution
at the end of each month that she is alive. Our approach is to make “monthly
tontine-annuity distributions” to surviving members that are designed to
139

See Sabin, supra note 15, at 22-26; infra subsection II.C.2.
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cancel out the age-related increase in mortality-gain distributions inherent
in simple tontine funds like the one in Figure 1 (i.e., the backloading).
It turns out that a tontine annuity constructed in this way closely
resembles an actuarially fair variable annuity (i.e., one without insurance
agent commissions or insurance company reserves, risk-taking, and profits).
To be sure, because the value of the assets in the tontine annuity fluctuates,
monthly tontine–annuity distributions would still be volatile. But if we
pretend that the underlying investment assets grow at a fixed, assumed rate
of return, then the tontine annuity would provide monthly payouts that are
approximately constant for life.
Moreover, it is relatively easy to determine the proper amounts of these
monthly tontine-annuity distributions. The monthly payout of any
actuarially fair annuity is simply equal to the account balance divided by a
monthly annuity factor. The monthly annuity factor is the premium for an
actuarially fair annuity that pays $1 per month for life. These monthly
annuity factors can easily be calculated from a mortality table and depend
only on the age of the annuitant and the assumed interest rate.140
140 This footnote explains how to compute a yearly annuity factor, which is the actuarial
present value of a life annuity that pays $1 each year for life. The monthly annuity factor is
approximately 12 times the yearly annuity factor.
We compute the annuity factor at each birthday by working backwards from the terminal age
of the mortality table. For the 2009 Social Security Administration table that we use (see infra
Appendix Table 1), the last entry is for age 119; thus the terminal age is 120, meaning that the table
implies an individual always dies before her 121st birthday.
If the individual is alive at birthday 120, she receives $1. Since she does not survive to birthday
121, the only payment she receives is the single dollar at age 120, so the actuarial present value of
the annuity is $1. Thus:

a120 = 1.
If the individual is alive at birthday 119, she receives $1. In addition, if she survives to birthday
120, she will receive a future payment stream having an actuarial value of a120. Thus, at birthday
119, the actuarial present value of payments is
a119 = 1 + (1 - q119 ) × a120 /(1 + d),
where: q119 is the probability of dying during age 119 (i.e., before birthday 120), which is given in
the mortality table; and d is the discount rate (e.g., d = .07, or 7%).
Similarly, if the individual is alive at birthday 118, she receives $1, and if she survives to birthday
119, she will receive a future payment stream having an actuarial value of a119. Thus, at birthday 118,
the actuarial value of payments is:
a118 = 1 + (1 - q118) × a119 /(1 + d).
Continuing in this manner, we calculate the annuity factor a117 for birthday 117, a116 for
birthday 116, and so on, until we reach the birthday of interest. For example, for the 2009 Social
Security Administration table and a discount rate of 7%, continuing until birthday 65 gives a65 =
10.359. (That is, the actuarial present value of an annuity that pays $1 each year for the life of a
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For example, Table 6 shows a sample monthly statement for a member
of a tontine annuity who lives through the first month after turning age 65
and who had exactly $250,000 in his account at the end of the prior month.
The only difference between the monthly statement in Table 4 and the
monthly statement in Table 6 is that instead of receiving a monthly mortalitygain distribution of just $1041.67 (as in Table 4), our hypothetical member
would receive a monthly tontine-annuity distribution of $2133. That $2133 is
computed by dividing the account balance on the last day of the month (i.e.,
$251,041.67 on April 30th) by the applicable monthly annuity factor (i.e.,
117.6939).141 That is, the monthly tontine-annuity distribution for the justturned-65-year-old member in Table 6 is $2133 ($2133.00 =
$251,041.67/117.6939).

65-year-old is $10.36 (at a 7% discount rate).) As mentioned, the monthly annuity factor is
approximately 12 times the yearly annuity factor, and Column 5 of Appendix Table 1, infra, shows
that the monthly annuity factor for the first month of the year in which our hypothetical retiree
turns 65 is 117.6939, or about 12 × 10.359.
141 Column 5 of Appendix Table 1, infra, shows the applicable monthly annuity factors for the
first month of each year starting with age 65, when monthly tontine-annuity distributions are
expected to commence.
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Table 6: Sample Monthly Tontine Annuity Statement for a Living Member
(for the First Month After the Member Turned 65)142

Date

Amount

Balance

Description

03/31
04/02
04/03
04/05
04/07
04/07
04/12
04/15
04/20
04/21
04/22
04/25
04/28
04/30
04/30

67.17
25.21
55.14
135.41
48.91
52.29
102.54
159.46
139.68
17.82
124.81
55.32
57.91
(2133.00)

250,000.00
250,067.17
250,092.38
250,147.52
250,282.93
250,331.84
250,384.13
250,486.67
250,649.13
250,785.82
250,803.63
250,928.44
250,983.76
251,041.67
248,908.67

Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Tontine-annuity Distribution

Alternatively, a tontine annuity could be designed to make monthly
tontine-annuity distributions that mimic an inflation-adjusted variable
annuity. That inflation-adjusted tontine annuity would make lower monthly
tontine-annuity distributions in the early years but greater distributions for
those who live to later years. For example, if inflation is assumed to be 3%
per year, then the first monthly tontine-annuity distribution for the hypothetical
65-year-old in Table 6 would be just $1651.72 ($1651.72 =
$251,041.67/151.9876),143 but distributions in subsequent months would be
142 This hypothetical tontine annuity has approximately 5000 members of varying ages and
genders who have made varying contributions. Mortality gains are based on a fair transfer–plan,
and surviving members get a single payout at the end of the month, based on the applicable
monthly annuity factor.
143 Column 6 of Appendix Table 1, infra, shows the inflation-adjusted applicable monthly
annuity factors for the first month of each year starting with age 65, when monthly tontineannuity distributions are expected to commence.
This footnote explains how to compute a yearly inflation-adjusted annuity factor, which is the
actuarial present value of a life annuity that pays $1 the first year and then increases future annual
payments by the assumed inflation rate. The monthly annuity factor is approximately 12 times the
yearly annuity factor.
The annuity factor is computed in a manner similar to the uniform case in note 140, supra,
except that now it includes the inflation adjustment. Letting i denote the inflation rate (e.g., i =
.03 or 3%), then:
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larger and would eventually exceed the payout level of the not-adjusted-forinflation tontine annuity.
In short, a tontine annuity could be designed to resemble an actuarially
fair variable annuity or an actuarially fair inflation-adjusted variable annuity.
These tontine annuities would still be volatile because of fluctuations in the
value of the underlying investment assets, but backloading would be
eliminated.
3. Adding in Investment Income
In the simple tontine annuities we have considered so far, we have
assumed that contributions do not earn any interest. In the real world,
however, each member’s contributions would be invested, and the member’s
balance would grow (or shrink) according to its investment performance.
Accordingly, account balances at the end of each month would tend to be
higher, and monthly tontine-annuity distributions would also tend to be
higher. For example, if the tontine annuity in Table 6 had earned $1000 of
investment interest in that month, the balance in the account at the end of
the month would have been $1000 higher, and, consequently, the monthly
tontine distribution would have been $8.52 higher—$2141.52 instead of the
$2133, as shown in Table 6 ($2141.52 = $252,041.67/117.6939).144

a120 = 1,
a119 = 1 + (1 + i) × (1 - q119) × a120 /(1 + d),
a118 = 1 + (1 + i) × (1 - q118) × a119 /(1 + d),
and so forth. For example, we can show that if the inflation parameter is set to 3%, then a65 = 13.216.
As mentioned, the monthly annuity factor is approximately 12 times the yearly annuity factor,
and Column 6 of Appendix Table 1, infra, shows that the inflation-adjusted monthly annuity factor
for the first month of the year in which our hypothetical retiree turns 65 is 151.9876, or about 12 × 13.216.
144
See infra Table 7.
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Table 7: Sample Monthly Tontine Annuity Statement for a Living Member,
with Investment Earnings (for the First Month
After the Member Turned 65)145

Date

Amount

Balance

Description

03/31
04/02
04/03
04/05
04/07
04/07
04/12
04/15
04/20
04/21
04/22
04/25
04/28
04/30
04/30
04/30

67.17
25.21
55.14
135.41
48.91
52.29
102.54
159.46
139.68
17.82
124.81
55.32
57.91
1000.00
(2141.52)

250,000.00
250,067.17
250,092.38
250,147.52
250,282.93
250,331.84
250,384.13
250,486.67
250,649.13
250,785.82
250,803.63
250,928.44
250,983.76
251,041.67
252,041.67
249,900.15

Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Proceeds from FTP
Interest for the month
Tontine-annuity Distribution

4. Managing Investments
Investments in a tontine annuity would most likely be managed
collectively for the entire pool, but it would be possible to design a tontine
annuity which allows members to direct their own investments, just as
people often do with their self-directed 401(k) plans and IRAs.146 Pertinent
here, rates of return are likely to be much higher if the investments are

145 This hypothetical tontine annuity has approximately 5000 members of varying ages and
genders who have made varying contributions. Mortality gains are based on a fair transfer–plan,
and surviving members get a single payout at the end of the month based on the applicable
monthly annuity factor.
146 Of course, default investments could be offered to individual investors, just as target date
funds are typically a default investment offered in self-directed 401(k) plans. See U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., TARGET DATE RETIREMENT FUNDS —TIPS FOR
ERISA PLAN FIDUCIARIES (2013), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/fsTDF.pdf
(providing guidance to fiduciaries of 401(k) and other employee-directed retirement programs
regarding selecting and monitoring target date retirement funds).
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managed by professionals rather than allowing individuals to direct their
own investments.147
In theory, a tontine annuity could be managed by a discount broker, and
no money would have to be set aside for insurance agent commissions or
insurance company reserves, risk-taking, or profits. Those commercial
insurance charges can be quite hefty.148 For example, a recent Morningstar
survey of 2037 variable annuities showed an average administrative fee in
2014 of 1.33% of assets under management, and that fee is on top of the cost
of managing the underlying investments, which itself can easily run another
1.0%.149 To be sure, some discount brokers have recently teamed up with
147 See Jonathan Barry Forman, The Future of 401(k) Plan Fees, in NEW Y ORK UNIVERSITY
REVIEW OF BENEFITS AND E XECUTIVE COMPENSATION § 9.02[2]-[3] (2007) (noting that
large plan investors generally pay lower fees, have better portfolio allocations, and have professional investment advisors that pick better investment products); Alicia H. Munnell et al.,
Investment Returns: Defined Benefit vs. 401(k) Plans, ISSUE IN BRIEF (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Bos.
Coll., Chestnut Hill, Mass.), Sept. 2006, at 6, available at http://www.hrpolicy.org/
members/downloads/2006/CRR_IB_09-2006.pdf (finding that professionally managed defined
benefit plans outperformed individually managed 401(k) plans over the period 1988–2004).
148 Indeed, experts estimate that the typical commercial life annuity has a 12% “load” factor
due to the combination of administrative expenses and adverse selection; that is, the typical
commercial life annuity provides benefits that are worth just 88% of an actuarially fair annuity
(i.e., a “money’s worth ratio” of 88%). See MARK J. WARSHAWSKY, RETIREMENT I NCOME:
RISKS AND STRATEGIES 66 (2012) (“[D]ue to a combination of administrative costs and
selection effects, the nominal annuity is assumed to have a money’s worth ratio of 0.88, that is, the
couple faces a 12 percent load factor on their annuity purchase.”). Put differently, the payouts from
actuarially fair annuities would be around 15% higher than in current annuity markets. See James
Poterba et al., The Composition and Drawdown of Wealth in Retirement, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2011,
at 102 tbl.3 (providing that the actuarially fair life annuity for a 65-year-old-man in 2008 was
9.95% and the AnnuityShopper price for a commercial life annuity was just 8. 46%, thus indicating
a load factor of 17.6%: 9.95%/8.46% - 1 = 17.6%); see also Jeffrey R. Brown et al., The Role of Real
Annuities and Indexed Bonds in an Individual Accounts Retirement Program (“[T]he expected present
value of annuity payouts is typically below the purchase price of the annuity . . . .”), in RISK
ASPECTS OF INVESTMENT-BASED SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 321, 321-22 ( John Y. Campbell
& Martin Feldstein eds., 2001); James M. Poterba & Mark Warshawsky, The Costs of Annuitizing
Retirement Payouts from Individual Accounts (“The cost of such annuities, including both administrative and sales costs, the ‘adverse selection’ costs associated with voluntary purchase behavior, and
return on capital for the insurance company offering the annuity policy, affect the retirement
income that the participant receives for a given level of wealth accumulation.”), in ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF INVESTMENT-BASED SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 173, 173-74 ( John B.
Shoven ed., 2000); Benjamin M. Friedman & Mark J. Warshawsky, The Cost of Annuities:
Implications for Saving Behavior and Bequests, 105 Q.J. E CON. 135, 152 (1990) (arguing that
actuarially unfair annuity costs are a cause of lack of public participation in the individual life
annuity market); Olivia S. Mitchell et al., New Evidence on the Money’s Worth of Individual
Annuities, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1299, 1309 (1999) (finding that a typical retiree “would perceive a
noticeable ‘transaction cost’ when purchasing an annuity from a commercial insurance carrier”).
149 Variable Annuity Expense Analyzer, CHARLES SCHWAB, http://www.schwab.wallst.com/
Tools/VAAnalyzer/public (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/QW77-AE2K
(noting the March 31, 2014 Morningstar survey); see also INSURED RET. INST., 2011 IRI FACT
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insurance companies to offer low-cost variable annuities. For example,
Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., markets variable annuities with insurance
charges that range from 0.60% to 0.65% (again, not including the additional
administrative expenses involved in managing the investments),150 and The
Vanguard Group, Inc. offers a variable annuity with an insurance charge of
0.57%.151 Again, these insurance charges do not include the additional
administrative expenses involved in managing the underlying investments.
We are confident that discount brokers would be able to offer tontine
annuities at even lower costs. As there are no insurance guarantees associated
with tontine annuities, we believe that discount brokers could offer these
products with total annual costs, perhaps, as low as 0.30% of assets under
management, depending on the nature of the underlying investments. That
means retirees would get significantly more benefits than they do with
today’s high-cost variable annuities. For example, imagine a tontine annuity
that invested entirely in an S&P 500 stock index fund. We know that most
discount brokers offer an S&P 500 index fund with expense ratios of 0.10%
or less,152 and we believe that the tontine annuity management and
recordkeeping functions could be performed for as little as 0.20% of assets
under management. That means total costs could be as low as 0.30% of
assets under management.

BOOK 56 figs.3-5 (2011), available at http://www.advisorsexcel.com/downloads/2011FactBook.pdf
(showing that average total expenses for variable annuities in 2010 were 2.33%, compared with
average total expenses for mutual funds that year of just 1.32%). The additional expenses associated
with variable annuities include both so-called “mortality and expense” (M&E) charges and
separately stated administrative expenses.
150 CHARLES SCHWAB, supra note 149.
151 The Vanguard Group, Inc. offers a variable annuity with a total expense ratio ranging
from 0.46% to 0.77%. Tax-Deferred Retirement Savings with the Vanguard Variable Annuity,
VANGUARD, https://investor.vanguard.com/annuity/variable (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/YU8C-2UV6.
152 See Spartan 500 Index Fund—Investor Class, FIDELITY, https://fundresearch.fidelity.com/
mutual-funds/summary/315911206 (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5U4239BX (offering 0.10% gross expense ratio); see also Alicia H. Munnell et al., Will Regulations to
Reduce IRA Fees Work?, ISSUE IN BRIEF (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Bos. Coll., Chestnut Hill,
Mass.), Feb. 2013, at 2, available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/IB_13-2-508.pdf
(noting that many studies have found that actively managed funds underperform compared to
index funds); Richard W. Kopcke et al., Fees and Trading Costs of Equity Mutual Funds in 401(k)
Plans and Potential Savings From ETFs and Commingled Trusts (Ctr. for Ret. Research, Working
Paper No. 2009-27, 2009), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/wp_2009-27508.pdf (encouraging a shift from actively managed funds to exchange-traded funds or commingled
trusts).
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In that regard, TIAA–CREF Financial Services has been offering a lowcost, tontine-like product for years.153 Created in 1952, the College
Retirement Equities Fund (CREF) was the world’s first variable annuity.154
Today, CREF operates eight investment accounts that differ by objective:
stocks, bonds, money market, and social choice;155 and CREF keeps its costs
for managing those accounts at between 0.395% and 0.465% of assets under
management.156 CREF participants choose which fund to invest in; and
later on, they choose from among a variety of distribution options, including
one-life and two-life annuities.157 When a retiree selects a life annuity, the
annuity payments will depend on both the investment experience of the
chosen accounts and on the mortality experience of the other participants.158
Basically, within each investment account, CREF periodically adjusts the
annuity payments so that the present value of the aggregate amount
expected to be paid out over the participants’ remaining lifetimes matches
the current value of the assets in the account. If participants in the fund
“live longer . . . than expected, the amount payable to each will be less than
if they as a group die sooner than expected.”159 In short, like a tontine, the
mortality risk falls on the annuitants and is not guaranteed by CREF (or
TIAA).160
153 See Our History, TIAA–CREF FIN. SERVICES, https://www.tiaa-cref.org/public/
assetmanagement/about/why/our-history (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://
perma.cc/AD44-KSMY (describing the company’s products and programs since establishment).
154 Id.; see also Poterba & Warshawsky, supra note 148, at 191-98 (discussing the history and
development of individual annuities offered by TIAA–CREF).
155 See TIAA–CREF FIN. SERVS., 2013 ANNUAL R EPORT : COLLEGE RETIREMENT
EQUITIES FUND 7-30 (2013), available at http://www1.tiaa-cref.org/ucm/groups/content/
@ap_ucm_p_tcp_inco/documents/document/tiaa01007803.pdf (analyzing the performance of the
eight account types).
156 TIAA–CREF FIN. SERVS., PROSPECTUS: C OLLEGE RETIREMENT EQUITIES
FUND 6 (2014), available at http://www1.tiaa-cref.org/public/prospectuses/cref_prospectus.pdf.
157 Id. at 74-75. Of note, TIAA–CREF annuities have been using unisex life tables since 1982.
See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1066 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that TIAA–
CREF is subject to Title VII, thus forbidding the use of sex-based mortality tables to calculate
benefits based on contributions), vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223 (1983).
158 But see TIAA–CREF FIN. SERVS., supra note 156, at 76 (mentioning that mortality
experience has “not historically had a significant impact”).
159 Id. at 73. For more details, see generally TIAA–CREF FIN . S ERVS ., C OLLEGE
RETIREMENT EQUITIES FUND (“CREF”) SUPP. NO. 1 B-41 to B-42 (2014), available at
http://www1.tiaa-cref.org/public/prospectuses/cref_sai.pdf.
160 TIAA–CREF FIN. S ERVS., supra note 156, at 73. Of note, rather than using a fair
transfer–plan to share mortality gains from each dying member (as our tontine annuity would),
CREF’s method shares aggregate mortality gains and losses. Consequently, some participants will
get a better deal, and some will get a worse deal than they would with a fair transfer–plan. Cf.
Sabin, supra note 15, at 59-62 (discussing the bias present in group self annuities that give some
members better payouts than others).
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As mentioned, tontines were popular at the end of the nineteenth century,
but they fell out of favor at the beginning of the twentieth century, largely
due to fraud and mismanagement of early tontine funds.161 In today’s postERISA world, however, it would be relatively easy for the U.S. Securities &
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the U.S. Department of Labor’s
Employee Benefits Security Administration to regulate tontine annuities
and the fiduciaries that would manage them. Moreover, private sector
recordkeepers and custodians would help protect tontine annuity assets.
We live in an era in which new financial and lifetime income products
are created all of the time. Indeed, GLWB funds were developed in Canada
only recently, before spreading to the United States and other countries,162
and as mentioned, a number of discount brokers have recently teamed up
with insurance companies to offer low-cost variable annuities.163 Accordingly,
we anticipate that a number of discount brokers and insurance companies

Also, while our tontine pension (discussed infra Section II.D) results in forfeitures by workers
as well as retirees, CREF participants do not face any forfeitures at all until participants voluntarily
elect to take their distribution in the form of a one-life or two-life annuity, and typically such
elections are not made until retirement after age 59.5. TIAA–CREF FIN. SERVS., supra note 156,
at 72-75.
Finally, we note in passing that tontine annuities and CREF annuities are not the only kind
of “pooled annuities” that could share longevity risk among annuitants. See, e.g., Michel Denuit et
al., Longevity-Indexed Life Annuities, 15 N. AM. ACTUARIAL J. 97, 99-100 (2011) (proposing
longevity indexing as an alternative method to sharing longevity risk among annuitants and
annuity providers); Catherine Donnelly et al., Exchanging Uncertain Mortality for a Cost, 52 INS.:
MATHEMATICS & ECON. 65, 69, 71 (2013) (comparing pooled annuity funds with mortalitylinked funds); John Piggott et al., The Simple Analytics of a Pooled Annuity Fund, 72 J. RISK & INS.
497, 499-501 (2005) (discussing the effect of risk diffusion on payouts in group self annuities);
Andreas Richter & Frederik Weber, Mortality-Indexed Annuities: Managing Longevity Risk via
Product Design, 15 N. AM. ACTUARIAL J. 212, 216-21 (2011) (proposing mortality indexing as a tool
for improving traditional annuities); Michael Z. Stamos, Optimal Consumption and Portfolio Choice
for Pooled Annuity Funds, 43 INS.: MATHEMATICS & ECON. 56, 58-61 (2008) (discussing how
pooling effectively insures against longevity risk); Raimond Maurer et al., Participating Payout Life
Annuities: Lessons from Germany 1 (Pension Research Council, Working Paper No. 2012-03, 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2078114 (noting that “participating
life annuities offer guaranteed minimum benefits” for life and “an additional non-guaranteed
surplus” based on investment return, mortality, and costs); Roberto Rocha & Dimitri Vittas,
Designing the Payout Phase of Pension Systems: Policy Issues, Constraints and Options 28-47 (The World
Bank Non Bank Fin. Insts. Grp., Working Paper No. 5289, 2010), available at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/05/04/000158349_2010050409230
3/Rendered/PDF/WPS5289.pdf (proposing several policy responses to various types of pension
risks).
161 See supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
162 See Milevsky & Shao, supra note 95, at 50, 56 (discussing the creation of GLWB products
in Canada and their subsequent spread to the United States).
163 See supra text accompanying notes 150-151.
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will want to develop new tontine annuity products and seek the regulatory
approvals that might be needed.
5. Adverse Selection Is Always a Challenge for Annuities
To be sure, underutilization would be a problem for tontine annuities,
just as it is for traditional annuities. All in all, as more fully explained below,
people rarely choose to buy annuities voluntarily. In fact, over the years,
there has been a significant decline in the annuitization of retirement
savings by American workers. The shift from traditional defined benefit
plans to defined contribution plans is a large part of the story,164 as defined
contribution plans typically distribute benefits in the form of lump sum
distributions rather than as annuities.165 Indeed, relatively few defined
contribution plans even offer annuity options, and, in any event, not many
participants elect those annuity options.166 In short, the demand for annuities
is lower than expected, a shortfall which has come to be known as the
“annuity puzzle.”167
164 See WILLIAM J. WIATROWSKI, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR S TATISTICS, CHANGING
LANDSCAPE OF EMPLOYMENT-BASED RETIREMENT BENEFITS 1 (2011), available at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/changing-landscape-of-employment-based-retirement-benefits.pdf
(“It is well documented that the prevalence of defined benefit plans is declining; in many cases,
such plans have been replaced by defined contribution plans.”); see also William J. Wiatrowski, The
Last Private Industry Pension Plans: A Visual Essay, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 2012, at 3, available
at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2012/12/art1full.pdf (“[Defined benefit] plans are becoming rare
for workers in private industry.”).
165 TOWERS WATSON, supra note 48, at 15.
166 See, e.g., CARLOS FIGUEIREDO & SANDY MACKENZIE, AARP P UB. POLICY INST.,
OLDER AMERICANS’ AMBIVALENCE TOWARD ANNUITIES: RESULTS OF AN AARP SURVEY
OF PENSION P LAN AND IRA DISTRIBUTION CHOICES 6 n.6 (2012), available at
http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/public_policy_institute/econ_sec/2012/surveypension-ira-distribution-AARP-ppi-econ-sec.pdf (noting that the 54th Annual Survey of Profit
Sharing and 401(k) Plans carried out by the Plan Sponsor Council of America found that just “16.6
percent of all plans surveyed offered annuities as a distribution option, while 60.2% offered
installments”); BEVERLY J. ORTH, APPROACHES FOR PROMOTING VOLUNTARY ANNUITIZATION
(2008), available at http://www.soa.org/library/monographs/retirement-systems/retirement2020/
2008/november/mono-2008-m-rs08-01-orth.pdf (“[A] large percentage [of defined contribution
plans] offer no [annuity] options. . . . [T]he vast majority of IRAs are never converted to an
annuity.”); Paul J. Yakoboski, Retirees, Annuitization and Defined Contribution Plans, TRENDS &
ISSUES (TIAA–CREF Institute, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 2010, at 3, available at https://www.tiaacrefinstitute.org/public/pdf/institute/research/trends_issues/ti_definedcontribution0410.pdf (finding
that only around 19% of retirees with significant defined contribution plan assets but little defined
benefit pension income annuitized a portion of their retirement savings).
167 See, e.g., Shlomo Benartzi et al., Annuitization Puzzles, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2011, at 143,
154-57 (discussing behavioral and institutional factors leading to the low demand for annuities);
Franco Modigliani, Life Cycle, Individual Thrift, and the Wealth of Nations, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 297,
307 (1986) (“[I]t is a well-known fact that annuity contracts, other than in the form of group
insurance through pension systems, are extremely rare.”). See generally Menahem E. Yaari,
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There are many reasons for this low demand for annuities, but adverse
selection is one of the most important reasons.168 Basically, those who
voluntarily purchase annuities tend to live longer than those that do not,
and, consequently, annuities are not priced very well for those with normal
life expectancies.169
a. Adverse Selection and Tontine Annuities
Adverse selection would also be a problem for tontine annuities. Just as
the people who voluntarily purchase traditional annuities tend to live longer
than those that do not, people who would choose to invest in a tontine
annuity would tend to live longer than those who would not. To be sure, the
tontine annuity would offer a better expected return than a commercial
variable annuity, but coverage would nevertheless be skewed towards
longer-lived investors. In short, as with traditional annuities, tontine
annuities would be underutilized.
b. Solving the Adverse Selection Problem
In general, problems with adverse selection are solved with broad coverage.170
For example, group health insurance premiums are low for large employers:
they can generally ignore adverse selection as long as they provide
healthcare coverage for virtually all of their employees. Similarly, Social
Security and large defined benefit plan pensions can generally ignore
adverse selection because they cover large numbers of employees. In short,
the solution to adverse selection is to cover a broad group of individuals,
and in the next Section, we show how a large employer could overcome the
adverse selection against tontine annuities by adopting a “tontine pension”
for a large group of its employees.
Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the Consumer, 32 REV. ECON. STUD. 137 (1965)
(analyzing the effect of the uncertainty of lifespan on consumer behavior).
168 See GEORGE A. (SANDY) MACKENZIE, ANNUITY MARKETS AND PENSION REFORM
55-57 (2006) (finding adverse selection and a lack of understanding of annuities to be potential
factors that reduce the demand for annuities); see also Annamaria Lusardi et al., Financial
Sophistication in the Older Population 12-16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
17,863, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2010395 (identifying
the lack of financial sophistication, especially among the older population, as a potential source of
poor decisionmaking about retirement).
169 See MACKENZIE, supra note 168, at 43 (explaining that, in the life annuities market,
moral hazard would lead to healthier behavior, meaning annuitants would tend to engage in
behaviors increasing their lifespan).
170 See id. at 41 (“Universal mandatory annuitization of part or all of the balances in individual
accounts would lower the average life expectancy of the annuitant population, and should lower
the average premium for each sex.”).
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D. Tontine Pensions
While tontine annuities would be attractive investments in their own
right, they are likely to be as underutilized as traditional annuities and other
lifetime income products.171 Individual investors generally underestimate
their life expectancies and shy away from annuities and other lifetime
income products. That is where pensions come in. Just as group health
insurance spreads health risks over large groups, traditional defined benefit
pension plans spread longevity risk over large groups: traditional pensions
either provide annuity-like retirement benefits to their participants or
purchase group annuities for them.172
Unfortunately, as we have seen, traditional defined benefit pensions in
both the private and public sector are often underfunded,173 and, in recent
years, we have seen numerous plan sponsors freeze, terminate, or replace
their plans.174 Market volatility, shrinking labor forces, and increasing life
expectancies have all exerted pressure on traditional defined benefit plans
and their sponsors. It is no wonder that we have seen defined contribution
plans supplant defined benefit plans in the private sector, and there is
increasing pressure on public employers to also consider replacing their
traditional defined benefit plans with defined contribution plans. For
example, 50% of full-time private industry workers in the United States
participated in defined contribution plans in 2011, up from 40% in 1989–
1990; meanwhile, participation in defined benefit plans fell from 42% in
1989–1990 to just 22% in 2011.175 All in all, the era of the traditional defined
benefit plan is largely over.176

171
172
173
174

See supra subsection II.C.5.
See supra subsection I.B.2.a.
See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
Id. Pertinent here, for example, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation took over “111
newly failed single-employer plans” in Fiscal Year 2013. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., supra
note 43, at 5. Further, the City of Detroit went into bankruptcy in large part because of its pension
debts. See Monica Davey et al., Detroit Ruling Lifts a Shield on Pensions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2013,
at A1 (discussing a bankruptcy judge’s finding that Detroit public employees’ pensions were not
protected in a bankruptcy).
175 WIATROWSKI, CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF EMPLOYMENT -BASED RETIREMENT
BENEFITS, supra note 164. More specifically, there were 683,000 private pension plans in 2011.
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS ADMIN., PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN 1
(2013), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/PDF/2011pensionplanbulletin.PDF. These are
ERISA-covered plans and do not include non-ERISA plans such as IRAs and Roth IRAs. Of
these ERISA-covered plans, just 45,256 were defined benefit plans (with 40.9 million participants
and $2.5 trillion in assets), while 638,390 were defined contribution plans (with 88.7 million
participants and $3.8 trillion in assets). Id. at 3 tbl.A1. Of these defined contribution plans, 513,000
were 401(k)-type plans. Id. at 2.
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That is where tontine pension plans can come in. Like a typical defined
contribution plan, a tontine pension would always be fully funded. Like a
traditional defined benefit plan, however, a tontine pension would make
annuity-like payments for as long as its retirees lived. This Section explains
how a tontine pension would work.
1. A Simple Tontine Pension
An employer who wanted to provide a tontine pension for its employees
would set up a defined-contribution-style pension plan, only instead of
investing its contributions in stocks and bonds, the employer would invest
in a tontine annuity for its employees. For example, each year, an employer
might make contributions of 10% of its employees’ salaries. Those contributions would be held in trust and invested in a tontine annuity, and allocated
to the individual tontine pension accounts of the participants. The difference is largely in the payouts. Rather than being able to receive lump sum
distributions (or periodic payments or a life annuity), each tontine pension
plan participant would receive benefits based on the tontine principle. That
is, the employer contributions for each participant, and the investment
earnings on those contributions, would be held in a tontine annuity, and the
“monthly tontine-pension distributions” would be the only kind of distributions made to retirees.
Also of note, a recent study estimated that 92% of the new pension plans formed from 2003–
2007 were defined contribution plans, as opposed to defined benefit plans. U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-333, PRIVATE PENSIONS: SOME KEY FEATURES LEAD
TO AN UNEVEN DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS 12 fig.2 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d11333.pdf. See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, USE OF TAX INCENTIVES FOR
RETIREMENT SAVING IN 2006 (2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/attachments/2011-10-14-TaxIncentives.pdf (examining participation and contributions to
various types of retirement plans by differing groups of workers).
176 See GEORGE A. (SANDY) MACKENZIE, THE DECLINE OF THE TRADITIONAL PENSION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THREATS TO RETIREMENT SECURITY 3 (2010) (“[M]any
observers believe that the defined benefit plan cannot survive as an institution in the private
sector.”); EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY: HOW THE
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PARADIGM CHANGED AMERICA 4 (2007) (noting “the shift from
the defined benefit modality to the defined contribution format”); Barbara A. Butrica et al., The
Disappearing Defined Benefit Pension and Its Potential Impact on the Retirement Incomes of Baby
Boomers, SOC. SECURITY BULL., 2009, at 1 (“The percentage of workers covered by a traditional
defined benefit (DB) pension plan that pays a lifetime annuity, often based on years of service and
final salary, has been steadily declining over the past 25 years.”); Janice Kay McClendon, The Death
Knell of Traditional Defined Benefit Plans: Avoiding a Race to the 401(k) Bottom, 80 TEMP. L. REV.
809, 812 (2007) (“Even before the increased legislative requirements, traditional defined benefit
plans were dying.”); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451,
454 (2004) (describing the “emergence of the defined contribution society” as a “revolution” in
pension plan form).
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More specifically, starting at the participant’s normal retirement age (or
later, if she so elected), the balance in her tontine pension account would be
paid out to her in the same manner as if she had purchased her own tontine
annuity with the employer contributions made on her behalf. No other form
of distribution would ever be permitted. For example, for a typical worker
who had accumulated $250,000 at her retirement, her monthly statement
would look just like the sample monthly statement for the tontine annuitant
in Table 7.
In short, a tontine pension would provide lifetime retirement income in
a way similar to a defined contribution platform. Essentially, the tontine
pension is like a defined contribution plan that only pays benefits in the
form of an actuarially fair life annuity. The difference is that rather than
having the plan sponsor purchase annuities for each retiring employee or
otherwise bear the risks and costs of providing the promised annuity
benefits, with a tontine pension, the plan sponsor bears no investment or
actuarial risks at all. The tontine pension would make distributions to
retirees out of the funds accumulated in the underlying tontine annuity and
in accordance with the fair transfer–plan and annuity-payback protocols.
These monthly tontine-pension distributions could be designed to mimic
immediate, level-payment annuities;177 immediate, inflation-adjusted
annuities;178 deferred annuities;179 or joint and survivor annuities.180
2. Tontine Pensions Compared with Other Pension Alternatives
a. Tontine Pensions Versus Traditional Defined Benefit Plans
A tontine pension could easily be designed to pay benefits that were, on
average, comparable to those paid by a traditional, final-average-pay defined
benefit plan. To be sure, the benefits paid by a tontine pension would vary
from month to month because of fluctuations in the value of the underlying
assets and the variability inherent in the indeterminateness of the deaths of

177
178
179

See infra Section III.C.
Id.
We note that a tontine pension is basically a kind of deferred annuity. For example, unless
an unmarried participant survives until retirement, she would forfeit the balance in her tontine
pension account (just like an unmarried participant in a traditional defined benefit plan). If she
wanted to defer her payouts even longer, for example, until age 85, then her account would simply
reinvest the mortality-gain distributions from dying participants until that time. Because of
adverse selection, it might be necessary for such deferral elections to be made years in advance.
180 For more on how to design such qualified joint and survivor tontine annuities, see infra
subsection V.D.3.
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other participants in the tontine pension. But, on average, benefits paid by a
tontine pension would approximate an actuarially fair life annuity.
With a defined benefit plan, the variation in monthly payments is eliminated, but only because the plan sponsor (the employer) guarantees the
promised payments. The plan sponsor bears all the contribution, mortality,
and investment risks, and we have, of course, seen how poorly that has
worked out, with thousands of failed plans in the private sector and numerous underfunded plans in both the private and public sectors.181 While plan
sponsors do a much better job growing investments than individuals,182 plan
sponsors do not always have the discipline to make the contributions that
are needed to keep their traditional defined benefit plans fully funded.183
On the other hand, tontine pensions would always be fully funded, just as
defined contribution plans are almost always fully funded—through regular
contributions equal to, for example, 10% of salary.184
In short, tontine pensions have two major advantages over traditional
defined benefit plan pensions. First, unlike traditional pensions which are
frequently underfunded, tontine pensions would always be fully funded.
Second, unlike traditional pensions where the plan sponsor must bear all the
investment and actuarial risks, with a tontine pension, the plan sponsor
bears neither of those risks.
b. Tontine Pensions Versus Typical Defined Contribution Plans
So how do tontine pensions stack up against typical defined contribution
plans? The answer is very well, indeed. Like a typical defined contribution
plan, a typical tontine pension might start with employer contributions
equal to, for example, 10% of salary. In the typical defined contribution plan,
however, the participants are often allowed to direct the investment of their
individual accounts, and payouts almost always take the form of lump sum
and periodic distributions, rather than life annuities.185 On the other hand,
with a tontine pension, the plan sponsor could, and should, manage the

181
182

See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Forman & Mackenzie, supra note 29, at 6-39 to 6-40 (“[T]raditional defined
benefit plans generally outperform [individually managed] 401(k) plans.”); Forman, supra note 147,
at 9-5 (noting that there were “numerous economies of scale associated with traditional pension
plans”); Munnell et al., supra note 147, at 6 (“Preliminary data suggest that IRAs underperform
employer-sponsored plans.”).
183 See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
184 To be sure, employers sometimes cut their contribution rates to defined contribution
plans, but such plans are still fully funded by the contributions that are made.
185 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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investments, and benefits would be paid out only as a tontine pension that
approximates an actuarially fair variable annuity.
To be sure, a plan sponsor could design a defined contribution plan
where the plan sponsor manages all the investments and where benefits are
only paid out in the form of a life annuity. But we know of no defined
contribution plans like that, and we doubt that any employer with a defined
contribution plan would have the discipline to design and continue such a
plan in the face of employee expectations and demands (1) that the employees
be allowed to direct their investments and (2) that the employees be allowed
to receive the balance in their accounts as periodic or lump sum distributions rather than only as life annuities.
In fact, we believe that a tontine pension is reasonably analogous to a
defined contribution plan with mandatory annuitization. There are a couple
of key differences, however. First, with a tontine pension, those who survive
until retirement would also benefit from the forfeitures of the accounts of
those who did not. As far as we know, that does not happen with any
defined contribution plans. Second, while a tontine pension would
automatically provide benefits that approximate an actuarially fair life
annuity, a defined contribution plan would have to purchase a loweryielding commercial annuity to provide a mandatory annuitization benefit.
c. Tontine Pensions Versus Cash Balance Plans
A tontine pension is also similar to a cash balance plan with mandatory
annuitization. In a cash balance plan, the sponsor credits hypothetical
individual accounts with contributions of, for example, 10% of compensation. As with traditional defined benefit plans, the default benefit in a cash
balance plan is a life annuity; however, cash balance plans typically allow
lump sum and periodic distributions as well.186 Indeed, we doubt that there
are many cash balance plans that require benefits be taken in the form of a
life annuity, and we doubt that there are many employers that would have
the discipline to design or to continue such a plan in the face of employee
expectations and demands that the employees be allowed to receive the
balance in their accounts as periodic or lump sum distributions rather
than only as annuities.

186 See FAQs About Cash Balance Pension Plans, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.,
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/FAQs/faq_consumer_cashbalanceplans.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/YHH2-Q4S6 (noting that cash balance plan participants can receive
these kinds of distributions).
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Moreover, because cash balance plans are defined benefit plans, like traditional pensions, cash balance plans are often underfunded.187 On the other
hand, with a tontine pension, the plan sponsor’s contributions would be
fixed at, for example, 10% of compensation, and the plan would then be fully
funded with those actual contributions. The plan sponsor would then
manage and grow the investments, and the tontine-pension distributions
would approximate an actuarially fair life annuity.
3. Summary of the Advantages and Disadvantages of Tontine Pensions
In essence, a tontine pension would be like a traditional defined benefit
pension plan, except that it would always be fully funded and the plan
sponsor would never bear any of the investment or actuarial risks. Participants
would receive monthly tontine pension benefits for as long as they lived,
and a tontine pension could be designed to provide inflation-adjusted
annuities, deferred annuities, or joint and survivor annuities.188 Conceivably,
individual participants could be allowed to make additional elective
contributions to their accounts, just as they do now under 401(k)-type
plans.189
The principal disadvantage of a tontine pension is that monthly
payments would vary in amount. One source of variation is the randomness
of member deaths, but the more individuals who participate in the plan, the
less significant that noisiness would be. For a tontine pension that covers
thousands of participants, the variation due to random deaths would be
minimal.190 However, there could still be considerable variation due to
volatility in both the value of the underlying assets and the rate of return on
those assets.191
Finally, as with traditional defined benefit plans, participants who live
the longest would collect the most benefits, and those who died young
might not even recover the amounts contributed on their behalf. Of course,
that is the nature of traditional defined benefit plans, life annuities, and
most other lifetime income products, so it is not a “disadvantage” unique to
tontine pension plans.
187 See Kevin Olsen, PBGC Sues to Take Over Dewey & LeBoeuf Retirement Plans, PENSIONS
& INVESTMENTS (May 15, 2012), http://www.pionline.com/article/20120515/ONLINE/
120519943/pbgc-sues-to-take-over-dewey-amp-leboeuf-retirement-plans, archived at http://
perma.cc/L5ZT-UTFW (describing an example of an underfunded cash balance pension plan).
188 See supra notes 177-180 and accompanying text.
189 But see infra subsection V.D.2 (providing reasons why participants might be reluctant to
make such contributions).
190 See supra subsection II.B.3.a.
191 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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III. MODELING A SIMPLE TONTINE PENSION
In this Part, we design a model tontine pension for a large employer and
then use a computer simulation to see what kinds of tontine pension
benefits the participants could expect to receive.
A. The Parameters of the Simulation
Our computer simulation uses a pool of approximately 170,000 members
(approximately 100,000 active employees and 70,000 retirees). The
parameters of the simulation are as follows:


The employer hires 3600 employees each year (300 each month).



The employee’s gender is randomly selected, equiprobably male or
female.



Each employee is hired on her 35th birthday and works continuously
for the employer for 30 years until age 65, or earlier death.192


Each employee is hired at a salary of $50,000 a year, and her
salary increases 4.0% each year.193



At retirement, each employee receives a tontine pension until
death.





In this simple simulation, nobody is married (so no
joint and survivor annuity benefits are needed).

The account balances of those who die are forfeited.194

Every year, the employer contributes 10% of salary for every employee
to the tontine pension.195

192 We chose 30 years as a reasonable career with the employer. Obviously, workers who work
35 years would earn proportionally more tontine pension benefits, and those who work 25 years
would earn proportionately less benefits. Tontine pension benefits would also vary if workers
started working before or after our assumed start age of 35 or retired before or after our assumed
retirement age of 65.
193 In that regard, for example, the CalSTRS defined benefit plan uses a 3.75% annual wage
growth assumption. MILLIMAN, supra note 19, at 57 tbl.B.1.
194 If we had assumed that living workers could leave, their account balances would go with
them to their new employer’s plan, and vice versa, so we ignore them.
195 We use the very plausible 10% contribution rate. That rate has the added advantage that it
is easy to extrapolate away from it. For example, if one thinks that 15% is a better contribution
rate, one need only multiply most of our model’s results by 150%. Nor must the contributions
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Investment return: funds are professionally managed and earn 7.0%
net of investment expenses each and every year, compounded annually.196



Inflation is 3.0% each year.197



Workers receive no payouts until age 65,198 and then retirees receive
either uniform (fixed) annuity-type payouts or, alternatively, inflationadjusted annuity-type payouts.199



The mortality model is based on the Social Security Administration
2009 unisex mortality table.200


Therefore, at equilibrium, approximately 3000 out of the
3600 initial hires each year reach age 65; approximately
100,000 are actively employed at any time; and there are
approximately 70,000 retirees at any point in time.

B. Calculation of the Retirement Balance
At the outset, Table 8 shows how this tontine pension would work for
workers ages 35 through 64. Column 1 of Table 8 shows the age of each
worker from ages 35 through 64. Column 2 shows the salary of that worker
each year. Column 3 shows the amount of the 10%-of-salary contribution
that her employer makes to the tontine pension on her behalf each year.

necessarily come from the employer: the results would be exactly the same if the employer and
employee each contributed 5% of salary, for a total of 10%.
196 Our 7.0% investment return assumption is also fairly reasonable. For example, the
CalSTRS defined benefit plan uses 7.5% as its estimate of investment return (net of investment
and administrative expenses). MILLIMAN, supra note 19, at 57 tbl.B.1. While many public pension
plans have even higher assumed rates of return and have historically achieved those higher rates of
return, many analysts believe we are in a low return environment for the indefinite future. See
James J. Rizzo & Piotr Krekora, Presentation on the Goldilocks Principle & Investment Return
Assumptions at Florida Government Finance Officers Association 2013 Annual Conference 41
(June 25, 2013), available at http://www.fgfoa.org/Assets/Files/Jim_Rizzo_Presentation_PDF.pdf
(finding that 6.78% was the average rate of return projected by 8 national investment consulting
firms for public pension plan portfolios over the next 15 years, compared with the 8% rate of return
that those plans commonly assume).
197 For example, the CalSTRS defined benefit plan uses a 3.0% inflation assumption. MILLIMAN, supra note 19, at 57 tbl.B.1.
198 To make the simulation less complicated, only the retirement phase (i.e., the payouts to
those age 65 and older) was simulated. The account balance at age 65 was set equal to the expected
value (i.e., the statistical average) of the account of a worker who survives to age 65. The number
of workers surviving to retirement was set to its expected value from the Social Security
Administration’s 2009 unisex life table. Bye, supra note 109.
199 That is, the expected value of payouts is either uniform or inflation-adjusted.
200 Bye, supra note 109.
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Column 4 shows the account balance at the end of the year, not including
the mortality gains that would result from the forfeitures from other
members who died that year.201 Column 5 shows the worker’s probability of
dying during that year. Finally, Column 6 shows the closing balance in the
worker’s account including the mortality gains that result from the forfeitures from other members who died that year.202 The final row of Table 8
shows that a worker who lived (and worked) from age 35 through age 64 and
retired at 65 would have a final pre-retirement salary of $155,933 (Column 2)
and would have a starting retirement balance in her tontine pension account
of $843,376 (Column 6).

201 It is calculated as the sum of the prior year’s balance multiplied by (1 plus the interest
rate) plus the current year’s contribution multiplied by the square root of (1 plus the interest rate).
202 This is the expected value of the balance that results from mortality gains. See supra note
198. It is computed by taking the preliminary balance in Column 4 and dividing it by (1 minus the
death probability) in Column 5. For example, the closing balance in the account of an employee at
age 64 is $843,377 ($843,376.82 = $833,161/(1 - 0.012113)) (minor error due to rounding).
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Table 8: Calculation of the Retirement Balance

Age

Salary

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

$50,000
$52,000
$54,080
$56,243
$58,493
$60,833
$63,266
$65,797
$68,428
$71,166
$74,012
$76,973
$80,052
$83,254
$86,584
$90,047
$93,649
$97,395
$101,291
$105,342
$109,556
$113,938
$118,496
$123,236
$128,165
$133,292
$138,623
$144,168
$149,935
$155,933

Contribution Preliminary
Balance
$5000
$5200
$5408
$5624
$5849
$6083
$6327
$6580
$6843
$7117
$7401
$7697
$8005
$8325
$8658
$9005
$9365
$9740
$10,129
$10,534
$10,956
$11,394
$11,850
$12,324
$12,817
$13,329
$13,862
$14,417
$14,994
$15,593

$5172
$10,920
$17,294
$24,349
$32,144
$40,743
$50,218
$60,644
$72,107
$84,696
$98,512
$113,665
$130,273
$148,468
$168,396
$190,215
$214,102
$240,247
$268,856
$300,150
$334,376
$371,812
$412,774
$457,604
$506,681
$560,438
$619,364
$684,024
$755,050
$833,161

Death
Probability

Closing
Balance

0.001261
0.001332
0.001420
0.001527
0.001653
0.001796
0.001955
0.002133
0.002332
0.002550
0.002786
0.003041
0.003322
0.003630
0.003963
0.004326
0.004707
0.005086
0.005455
0.005827
0.006234
0.006685
0.007166
0.007677
0.008233
0.008854
0.009552
0.010323
0.011172
0.012113

$5179
$10,935
$17,319
$24,386
$32,197
$40,816
$50,316
$60,774
$72,275
$84,912
$98,787
$114,011
$130,707
$149,009
$169,066
$191,042
$215,114
$241,475
$270,331
$301,910
$336,473
$374,315
$415,753
$461,144
$510,888
$565,444
$625,338
$691,159
$763,580
$843,376
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C. Calculation of the Monthly Tontine-Pension Distributions
At retirement, the expected monthly payout is identical to the actual
monthly payout of an actuarially fair annuity. As we have seen, the monthly
payout of an actuarially fair annuity equals the account balance divided by
the applicable monthly annuity factor.203 For example, consider a worker
who worked from age 35 through age 64 and retired on the last day of that
year. We can see from the last entry in Table 8 that the closing account
balance for that worker was $843,376. Assuming that she wants to draw level
monthly tontine pension payments for the rest of her life, she should start
by looking at Column 5 of Appendix Table 1, which shows that the uniform
monthly annuity factor for the first month after she turns 65 is almost 118.
Therefore, the first monthly distribution for a uniform tontine pension
would be $7166 ($7165.84 = $843,376/117.6939).
Alternatively, if this retiree instead wanted inflation-adjusted payments
for the rest of her life, Column 6 of Appendix Table 1 shows that the initial
monthly annuity factor for the first month after she turns 65 is almost 152.
Accordingly, the first monthly distribution for an inflation-adjusted tontine
pension would be just $5549 ($5548.98 = $843,376/151.9876).
Figure 2 plots the expected payouts from these uniform and inflationadjusted tontine pensions over time. The plot is for a member retiring on
her 65th birthday. The uniform payout is the amount of the monthly
payment in dollars. Ideally it is a constant $7166 per month for life—and
that is what an actuarially fair life annuity would pay.204 The actual payments
would fluctuate a little bit around that value, but as the plot shows, the
uniform payout curve is relatively smooth. Of course, that is what we would
expect given that our model assumes a constant 7% rate of return and a
constant 3% inflation rate. Consequently, monthly fluctuations result only
from the randomness of deaths in the population, but with approximately
70,000 retirees at any point in time, those fluctuations are insignificant.

203
204

See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
For comparison, an annuity purchased from a commercial insurer would make a fixed
monthly payment but of a lower amount depending on the insurer’s load charge. For a typical load
of 10%, the monthly payment would fall to just $6449.40 ($6449.40 = $7166 × 90%).
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Figure 2: Monthly Payout for a Typical Long-Lived Member,
Uniform and Inflation-Adjusted

By contrast, the inflation-adjusted payout starts at $5549 per month and
increases at an annual rate of 3% per year—that is what an actuarially fair
life annuity with a 3% escalator would pay (and the model assumes a
constant 3% inflation rate). Again, the actual payments will fluctuate a little
bit around those values, but as the plot shows, the inflation-adjusted payout
curve is also quite smooth.
D. Adequacy
All in all, we have shown how a large employer could use a tontine
pension to provide retirement benefits for its employees. Given the
assumptions in our model, Table 8 showed that our hypothetical retiree
would have a final salary of $155,933 at age 64 and would have accumulated
$843,376 by age 65. The latter sum would support a uniform tontine pension
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of around $7166 per month for life or an inflation-adjusted tontine pension
that starts at around $5549 per month at age 65 and increases in later
months.
It is relatively easy to determine how much pre-retirement income this
30-year, 10%-of-salary tontine pension would replace. For example,
multiplying the uniform monthly benefit of $7166 by 12 months yields an
annual tontine pension of $85,992 ($85,992 = 12 × $7166), and it is easy to see
that the tontine pension would replace 55.1% of pre-retirement earnings in
the first year of retirement (i.e., a “replacement ratio” of 55.1% (0.5514676 =
$85,992/$155,933)).205 Similarly, the inflation-adjusted monthly benefit
would yield an annual tontine pension starting at around $66,588 ($66,588 =
12 × $5549) and a replacement ratio of around 42.7% of pre-retirement
earnings (0.4270295 = $66,588/$155,933).206 In addition to these tontine
pensions, however, our retiree would almost certainly receive Social Security
benefits, and those Social Security benefits would replace another 35% to
40% of her pre-retirement income.207
All in all, it seems that a 10%-of-salary tontine pension would generate a
pretty substantial retirement benefit for the typical worker. Moreover,
raising the tontine pension contribution rate (e.g., above 10%) or increasing
205 The replacement ratio is the ratio of income in retirement to income pre-retirement. The
desired replacement ratio is almost always assumed to be less than 100% because of the elimination
of work-related expenses, because some pre-retirement income was devoted to saving for
retirement, and because Social Security benefits are taxed more favorably than earned income. See
AON CONSULTING, REPLACEMENT RATIO STUDY: A MEASUREMENT TOOL FOR RETIREMENT
PLANNING 24 (2008), available at http://www.aon.com/about-aon/intellectual-capital/
attachments/human-capital-consulting/RRStudy070308.pdf (estimating that required replacement
ratios ranged from 77% for a person earning $80,000 a year in 2008 to 94% for a person earning
$20,000 that year).
206 Because of the impact of the 3% inflation assumption and the passage of time on the
monthly tontine pension annuity factors, our retiree could expect that her monthly tontine
pension benefits for the 11 months following her initial month of retirement would be slightly
larger than the $5549 that she would receive in the first month of that retirement year.
Accordingly, she should receive an annual pension of slightly more than $66,588 at age 65 and
have a replacement ratio of slightly higher than 42.7%.
207 See VIRGINIA P. RENO & E LISA A. WALKER, NAT’L ACAD. S OC. INS., SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS, FINANCES, AND POLICY O PTIONS: A PRIMER 5 (2013), available at
http://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/2013_Social_Security_Primer_PDF.pdf (showing
that the current Social Security system replaces around 42% of the pre-retirement earnings of a
worker with “medium” earnings); see also PETER BRADY ET AL., INV. C O. INST., THE SUCCESS
OF THE U.S. RETIREMENT SYSTEM 17-20 (2012), available at http://www.ici.org/
pdf/ppr_12_success_retirement.pdf (showing how Social Security replacement rates vary over time
for representative workers); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE 2012 LONG-TERM PROJECTIONS
FOR SOCIAL S ECURITY: A DDITIONAL INFORMATION 16 exhibit 10 (2012), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43653 (showing how replacement rates vary with pre-retirement
earnings).
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the number of working years (e.g., above 30) covered by the tontine pension
would result in retirees receiving even more benefits and having even higher
replacement ratios.
E. Tontine Pensions in the Real World
Our model does a respectable job of showing how a tontine pension
could work in the real world. To be sure, the assumptions of the model are
somewhat rigid. In the real world, inflation is not always 3% per year, wages
do not always increase by 4% per year, and investments do not always earn a
7% rate of return. Each of those parameters is highly variable, although their
average values are probably pretty close to our assumed values. In general,
that real world variability could easily result in retirees receiving smaller (or
larger) monthly distributions from their tontine pensions. To the extent that
that real-world volatility puts retirement income security at risk, it is worth
reiterating that either raising the tontine pension contribution rate or
increasing the number of working years covered by the tontine pension
would result in retirees receiving more benefits and having higher replacement
ratios.
IV. REPLACING THE CALIFORNIA STATE TEACHERS’ RETIREMENT
SYSTEM WITH A TONTINE PENSION
In this Part, we consider how a tontine pension for a large employer
would work. Given the strictures of ERISA and federal securities regulation
laws, we acknowledge that it may be a challenge for a private pension plan
sponsor to create a tontine pension under current law.208 On the other hand,
public employers are exempt from most of ERISA’s pension regulations.209
Accordingly, we believe that a state government could easily create a tontine
pension that would not run afoul of federal law. As we have seen, such a
tontine pension would be fully funded and would make annuity-like
payments to retirees for as long as they lived.210
As most states already have pension plans that cover most of their
employees, what we are really talking about here is the prospect of replacing
208 For a more thorough discussion of the legal issues involving tontine pensions, see infra
Section V.B.
209 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 4(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1)
(2012) (exempting government plans).
210 See supra Section II.D. We recognize that many governments use their pension plans to
provide disability benefits, and some also use their pension plans to provide retiree health benefits.
However, for simplicity we have ignored both disability benefits and retiree health benefits in this
Article.
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an existing state pension plan with a tontine pension. In particular, some
states might want to replace their underfunded traditional defined benefit
pension plans with tontine pensions. For our example, this Part considers
whether California might want to replace the $74 billion underfunded
California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) defined benefit
plan with a tontine pension.211
A. Background on the California State Teachers’ Retirement System
CalSTRS is the largest educator-only pension in the world, with a
membership of 868,493 and assets of approximately $187.1 billion as of
October 31, 2014.212 One of the largest programs that CalSTRS administers
is its traditional defined benefit retirement plan, where benefits are based on
a member’s years of service, age, and highest compensation.213 Essentially,
members receive an annual retirement benefit (B) that is equal to 2%
multiplied by the number of years of service (yos) multiplied by final
average compensation ( fac) (B = 2% × yos × fac).
For the fiscal year that ended on June 30, 2013, the CalSTRS traditional
defined benefit pension had 416,643 active members with an average annual
salary of $61,153 and 269,274 retired members and beneficiaries with an
average annual retirement benefit of $43,308.214 Also, as of June 30, 2013, the
CalSTRS defined benefit plan was only 66.9% funded, with an unfunded
liability of almost $74 billion.215 The normal retirement benefit cost,
expressed as a percentage of total compensation, was 16.818%.216 In addition, as of June 30, 2013, CalSTRS needed another 14.620% of total compensation to amortize its $74 billion unfunded liability over 30 years.217

211
212

See MILLIMAN, supra note 19, at 10.
CalSTRS at a Glance, CALSTRS, http://www.calstrs.com/glance (last visited Jan. 16,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/WPH6-72ML.
213 See Retirement Benefits Calculator, CALSTRS, http://resources.calstrs.com/CalSTRSCom
ResourcesWebUI/Calculators/Pages/RetirementBenefit.aspx (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/L86P-VXGC (providing a list of factors used to calculate benefits). CalSTRS also
administers a defined benefit supplement program, a cash balance benefit program, and CalSTRS
“Pension2.” For more details, see generally CAL. STATE TEACHERS’ RET. SYS., OVERVIEW OF
THE CALIFORNIA STATE TEACHERS’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM AND RELATED ISSUES (2014),
available at http://www.calstrs.com/sites/main/files/file-attachments/overview_2014_v3.pdf.
214 MILLIMAN, supra note 19, at 10.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 18 tbl.1. Under the entry-age normal cost accounting method, the normal cost is
calculated to produce a level cost over each employee’s career (i.e., a level percentage of payroll).
The normal cost generally represents the expected cost of projected benefits attributable to work
performed and pension benefits earned in the current plan year. Id. at 15.
217 Id. at 47 tbl.15.
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B. Replacing the California State Teachers’ Retirement System Defined Benefit
Plan with a Tontine Pension
There are a variety of possible ways to replace a traditional pension like
the CalSTRS defined benefit plan with a tontine pension. Perhaps the most
likely approach would be to keep the current defined benefit plan for all
current employees but to close entry to that plan and require all new
employees to join a newly created tontine pension.218
A more interesting approach would be for CalSTRS to freeze its current
defined benefit plan and add a new tontine pension for all future benefit
accruals.219 At retirement, beneficiaries would then receive the defined
benefit plan benefits that they have already accrued, but they would not
accrue any additional benefits under their traditional defined benefit plan;
instead, future contributions would be made to a new tontine pension.
Theoretically, CalSTRS would freeze its defined benefit plan and add a
tontine pension with future retirement contributions set at, for example,
16.818% of compensation (i.e., the current CalSTRS defined benefit plan’s
normal cost rate).220 Going forward, such a plan would be roughly as
generous as the current plan, but CalSTRS would never again have to worry
about underfunding as a result of future benefit accruals. To be sure, this way
of replacing the CalSTRS defined benefit plan with a tontine pension would
do nothing to reduce its $74 billion unfunded liability, and that obligation
would still need to be met by the state of California.
We do not mean to suggest that replacing the CalSTRS defined benefit
plan with a tontine pension would be politically easy. We merely suggest
that a tontine pension could provide an alternative way of providing lifetime
retirement income to California teachers, and we reiterate that unlike
traditional defined benefit plans—which are often underfunded—a tontine
pension can never become underfunded.

218 Cf. Jonathan Barry Forman, Public Pensions: Choosing Between Defined Benefit and Defined
Contribution Plans, 1999 MICH. ST. L. REV. 187, 208-10 (discussing various ways to transition
from a traditional defined benefit plan to a defined contribution plan, but noting the difficulties
inherent in making this switch).
219 See id. at 210 (describing this approach).
220 See supra note 216 and accompanying text.

818

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 755

V. SOLVING THE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF
CREATING A TONTINE PENSION
Finally, this Part addresses some of the technical issues raised by tontine
pensions.
A. Taxation of Benefits
Presumably, tontine pension benefits would be taxed like other pension
benefits.221 Employer contributions to a tontine pension should be excluded
from the income of employees; the tontine pension fund’s earnings should
be exempt from tax; and retirees should be taxed only when they receive
their monthly tontine-pension distributions. At the same time, the employer
should be allowed a current deduction for its contributions to the tontine
pension.222 We note that the prospectus for CREF suggests that CREF’s
tontine-like pensions and annuities are taxed in accordance with these
principles.223
B. Legal Issues
Although not a certainty, it appears that tontine funds, tontine annuities,
and tontine pensions are all legal. As previously mentioned, investigations
of the insurance industry in New York led to the enactment of legislation in
1906 that all but banned tontines.224 To be sure, the legislation did not
specifically prohibit the sale of tontines; instead, it just made it difficult for
companies to defer payments beyond one year.225 Many states followed New
York’s lead, and tontines soon fell out of favor.226
Much has changed since the beginning of the twentieth century, however.
In particular, financial products today do a much better job at
recordkeeping,227 and investment assets are usually held by independent
221
222

See supra subsection I.B.1.
To the extent that any employees make (or are deemed to make) any after-tax
contributions to their tontine pension funds, they should be allowed to recover those contributions tax-free, just as they could with a typical pension or annuity. See supra note 33.
223 See TIAA–CREF FIN. S ERVS., supra note 156, at 81-87 (describing the tax implications
of similar existing pension plans).
224 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
225 COOPER, supra note 9, at 56.
226 Id. at 57.
227 Today, for example, there are numerous laws that govern the securities industry. The Laws
that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/
EWG5-9VWW. Also, we have seen that ERISA imposes a number of recordkeeping and
reporting requirements on pension plan sponsors. See supra subsection I.B.3.
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custodians.228 Also, most states have softened their views on lotteries
and gambling.229 Accordingly, there should be less suspicion about tontine
financial products. In fact, today, only Louisiana and South Carolina have
statutes that actually ban tontines.230 All in all, it seems likely that tontine
financial products could be designed in ways that would survive state
regulatory scrutiny. Indeed, as we have seen, CREF is arguably a tontine,231
and it operates in, and is expressly regulated, by the State of New York, as
well as by the insurance regulators of certain other states.232 Any state that
wished to set up a tontine pension for its own workers could enact a statute
to permit that state to do so.
Tontine financial products should also be able to withstand federal regulatory scrutiny. As long as tontine financial products maintain good records,
make adequate disclosures, and ensure that the underlying investment assets
are held by independent custodians, the SEC should be satisfied.
For some tontine pensions, ERISA may present some regulatory
hurdles. However, unless they are “established or maintained” by an
employers or a union, tontine funds and tontine annuities would not be
“employee benefit plans” within the meaning of ERISA’s section 4 coverage
rule, and therefore would not be subject to ERISA.233
228

Investor Bulletin: Custody of Your Investment Assets, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMIShttp://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/bulletincustody.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived
at http://perma.cc/8UQM-XJ6J.
229 Chris Isidore, Seven States that Don’t Have Lotteries, CNNMONEY (Dec. 17, 2013, 1:16
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/12/17/news/economy/states-without-lotteries, archived at
http://perma.cc/3CBZ-WLAV; Richard A. McGowan, A Short History of Gambling in the United
VIEWPOINTS
IN
CONTEXT,
http://ic.galegroup.com/ic/ovic/
States,
OPPOSING
ViewpointsDetailsPage/ViewpointsDetailsWindow?displayGroupName=Viewpoints&
disableHighlighting=false&prodId=OVIC&action=2&catId=&documentId=GALE%7CEJ3010079
223&userGroupName=sacr73031&jsid=62916e0a417a2c9be8c6da4f4edc7ffc (last visited Jan. 16,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/YQ73-5NHH.
230 McKeever, supra note 9, at 514.
231 See supra notes 153-160 and accompanying text.
232 TIAA–CREF FIN. SERVS., supra note 159, at B-44.
233 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2012)
(defining “employee benefit plan”); id. § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2012) (imposing coverage on “any
employee benefit plan”).
Moreover, to the extent that any tontine annuities might be subject to ERISA, we believe that
ERISA’s insurance savings clause is relevant with respect to any tontine annuity viewed as an
insurance product under the applicable state’s law. In that regard, ERISA’s preemption clause
provides that ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws . . . [that] relate to any employee
benefit plan”; however, the savings clause then exempts from preemption any state law “which
regulates insurance, banking, or securities.” Id. § 514(a), (b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(a), (b)(2)(A).
Congress generally left the regulation of insurance products to the states. Presumably, tontine
annuities sold by insurance companies would be subject to regulation by state insurance regulators.
But what about tontine annuities sold by a discount broker? Are these just investment products or
SION,
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On the other hand, tontine pensions established by employers or unions
would be “employee benefit plans” within the meaning of ERISA.234 As
mentioned above, government plans are exempt from ERISA, so state and
local governments could set up tontine pensions for their employees
without having to comply with ERISA.235
Conversely, private-sector tontine pension plans would be subject to
ERISA. The next question is whether there are any provisions of ERISA
that would prevent private employers from creating tontine pensions for
their employees. To be sure, traditional pensions exhibit tontine characteristics;
for example, those who live longer will accrue more (monthly) benefits than
those who die younger.236
Nevertheless, several provisions of ERISA may pose regulatory challenges for private-sector tontine pensions.
For example, with respect to defined benefit plans, Internal Revenue
Code section 401(a)(8) indicates that “forfeitures must not be applied to
increase the benefits any employee would otherwise receive under the
plan.”237 With a tontine pension, all participants are entitled to a benefit
that approximates an actuarially fair annuity. Therefore, those who live
longer will get more (monthly) benefits than those who die younger.
Because this is exactly what happens under a traditional defined benefit
plan, we believe that tontine pensions should not be viewed as applying
forfeitures to increase the benefits of other employees in violation of section
401(a)(8), and accordingly, we believe that the Internal Revenue Service
should be willing to issue guidance to that effect (e.g., a private letter
ruling). Moreover, we note that defined benefit plans have always been
allowed to invest in annuities for their employees. Accordingly, we believe
that defined benefit plans would be permitted to invest in tontine annuities.
Of course, employers might prefer to operate their tontine pensions on a
fully funded defined contribution plan platform. In that case, section
401(a)(8) would not be applicable.
ERISA’s vesting rules may also pose a regulatory challenge for tontine
pensions. For example, could a tontine pension meet the three-year cliff
are they insurance? We are unsure. However, because tontine annuities alone are not employee
benefit plans, we believe that they are outside the scope of ERISA.
234 In general, a tontine pension would be an “employee benefit plan . . . . established or
maintained by” an employer or employee organization within the meaning of ERISA section 4. Id.
§ 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2012); id. § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2012).
235 See id. § 4(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (2012) (exempting government plans).
236 COOPER, supra note 9, at 61 (explaining the distribution of benefits over time in traditional pensions).
237 I.R.C. § 401(a)(8) (2012).
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vesting rule that generally applies to employer contributions?238 How do we
interpret the fact that a single worker with a tontine pension account would
lose everything in her account at death, even if she had worked for the
employer for more than three years? Is forfeiture at death allowed in a
defined contribution plan investment?
One approach is to ask whether an employer with a defined contribution
plan could use employer contributions each year to buy commercial life
annuities for each employee. We believe an employer could do so. Because
tontine annuities would work just like commercial annuities, an employer
should be able to design a defined contribution plan that invests in tontine
annuities for its employees, even if those tontine annuities become worthless at death.239
ERISA’s fiduciary obligation rules could also pose some regulatory challenges for tontine pensions.240 For example, pension plans must be operated
for the exclusive benefit of employees or their beneficiaries, and plan
fiduciaries must act prudently and diversify the plan’s investments.241 Again,
we see no reason to be concerned about a pension operating as a tontine

238 See id. § 411(a)(2)(B)(ii) (“A plan satisfies the requirements of this clause if an employee
who has completed at least 3 years of service has a nonforfeitable right to 100 percent of the
employee’s accrued benefit derived from employer contributions.”); Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 § 203(a)(2)(B)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (same).
239 Another option is to begin by considering an individual with an IRA. IRAs are not subject
to ERISA, but the Internal Revenue Code rules that govern IRAs are very similar to the ERISA
rules governing defined contribution plans. For example, both IRAs and pensions receive favorable
tax treatment, and both are subject to the prohibited transactions rules. See supra Section I.B. We
do not believe that there is anything in the Internal Revenue Code that would prevent an
individual from having her IRA invest in a tontine fund or in a tontine annuity. Nor do we think
that ERISA would prevent a participant with a self-directed 401(k) plan from investing in a
tontine fund or annuity.
Finally, there is no doubt that an employer can create a defined contribution plan, make
contributions to that plan on behalf of its employees, and invest those contributions for the
benefit of its employees. The question comes down to whether a plan sponsor can invest employer
contributions in a tontine fund or tontine annuity knowing, as we do, that each employee will lose
the balance in her account when she dies. We see no reason why a plan sponsor would be
prohibited from doing so. (Granted, the spousal protection rules might impose forfeiture limits
with respect to married participants. We discuss those rules infra subsection V.D.3).
240 See I.R.C. § 401(a) (2012) (setting forth requirements for an employer’s stock bonus,
pension, or profit-sharing plan to constitute a qualified trust); Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012) (enumerating obligations of a fiduciary with
respect to such a plan). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN.,
MEETING YOUR FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES (2012), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/
pdf/meetingyourfiduciaryresponsibilities.pdf (explaining to employers how to administer their
retirement plans).
241 I.R.C. § 401(a) (2012); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 §§ 403, 404(a),
29 U.S.C. §§ 1103, 1104(a) (2012).
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pension or investing in tontine annuities, and we believe that the government
would issue guidance supporting our position.242
We believe that tontine funds, tontine annuities, and tontine pensions
could be designed in ways that comply with applicable state and federal laws.
C. Dealing with Market Volatility
Unlike a traditional defined benefit pension plan that makes fixed or
inflation-adjusted benefit payments, tontine pension benefit payments
would be volatile. Monthly tontine-pension distributions would vary with
fluctuations in the value of the underlying assets and with the variability
inherent in the indeterminate timing of the deaths of the other participants
in the tontine pension. The fluctuations attributable to the randomness of
the deaths of other participants would largely disappear as long as there are
enough participants in the tontine pension.243
In contrast, the volatility due to fluctuations in the value of the underlying
assets will not disappear. This is the same problem that any investor with a
defined contribution plan or variable annuity confronts.244 For example, an
investor who used the 4% rule to withdraw $40,000 from her individual
account in 2007 when her stock portfolio was worth $1,000,000 could only
withdraw around $20,000 in 2009 when that portfolio was worth just
$500,000. An investor can minimize the effects of market volatility by
investing conservatively in bonds, but the expected earnings on her portfolio
could fall dramatically.245
Of course, planning for that market volatility can help mitigate its
impact. Wise consultants with irregular earnings generally spend no more
money in the months that they get commissions than they do in the months
that they do not. Similarly, the investor discussed in the previous paragraph
could have spent just $30,000 of the $40,000 she withdrew in 2007 and saved
the other $10,000 to spend in 2009 when she withdrew just $20,000. That is,
242 Cf. Selection of Annuity Providers for Individual Account Plans, 72 Fed. Reg. 52,021
(proposed Sept. 12, 2007) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550) (proposing the establishment of a
“safe harbor” for selecting annuity providers to distribute benefits from “individual account plans
covered by title I” of ERISA).
243 See supra subsection II.B.3.a.
244 See supra notes 136-138 and accompanying text.
245 According to one projection, over the next 10 years, the expected return on U.S. stocks
will be 7.25%, while the expected return on U.S. Treasury bonds will be just 0.50%. See BNY
MELLON, 10-YEAR CAPITAL MARKET RETURN ASSUMPTIONS: CALENDAR YEAR 2013
(2013), available at http://us.bnymellonam.com/core/library/documents/knowledge/market_
commentary/bny_mellon_10_Year_capital_market_return_assumptions_2013.pdf (presenting 10year capital market return assumptions based on social and economic changes).
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individuals can smooth their consumption by underspending in the good
years so that they can spend more in the lean years. Smoothing products,
even “smoothed income annuities” can be purchased in the marketplace.246
A tontine pension could itself be designed to provide smoother distributions. For example, monthly distributions could be smoothed over a oneyear or even a five-year period.247 When the tontine pension administrator
determined that a certain monthly distribution would be higher than the
average distribution over the prior five years, the distribution could be split.
A basic distribution could go to the participant’s bank account immediately,
and the excess could go into a “holding account” for the participant. In a
later month when the tontine pension administrator determined that the
distribution would otherwise be lower than the average for the prior five
years, the holding account could be tapped to provide a larger distribution.
The funds in the holding account could be invested with all of the other
assets held by the tontine pension, and presumably, at that member’s death,
any balance in her holding account could be paid to her estate.
In short, income smoothing could be accomplished either inside or
outside of a tontine pension. In any event, the volatility in monthly distributions attributable to fluctuations in the value of the underlying investment assets held in a tontine pension is no worse a problem for tontine
pensions than it is for defined contribution plans or variable annuities.
D. Gender Issues
1. In General
While insurance companies can typically price the annuities that they
offer to men and women differently, pension plans cannot offer different
pricing based on gender. 248 Pension plans cannot require higher
contributions from women or pay women lower benefits.249 Therefore,

246 See Per Linnemann, A New DC Concept from Denmark, RETIREMENT INCOME J. (Sept.
4, 2013), http://retirementincomejournal.com/issue/september-5-2013/article/a-new-dc-conceptfrom-denmark, archived at http://perma.cc/M89E-DWN7 (discussing Denmark’s success with
“smoothed income annuities”).
247 TIAA–CREF allows participants to choose variable annuity payments that change
monthly or yearly. See TIAA–CREF FIN. SERVS., TIAA–CREF RETIREMENT STRATEGIES:
HELPING YOU REACH YOUR RETIREMENT SAVINGS GOALS 35-36 (2006), available at
https://www.tiaa-cref.org/public/pdf/retire_strategies.pdf (explaining how to choose a retirement plan).
248 See supra note 72 and accompanying text (explaining that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
prohibits pension plans from requiring higher contributions from women than men or paying
women lower benefits than men).
249 Id.

824

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 755

when an employee retires with a traditional defined benefit pension, the
retiree will see the same monthly pension benefits for life, regardless of
gender. For example, CalSTRS pays identical pensions to retired men and
women teachers who have the same service records.250 To be sure, defined
benefit plan actuaries take the gender of participants and their partners into
account when determining the contributions that the plan sponsor needs to
make. Retiring women can expect to collect more monthly benefit checks
than their male counterparts, but the monthly payments must be equal for
men and women.251
Tontine funds and tontine annuities could account for gender.252
However, a tontine pension, like a traditional pension, would not be
permitted to discriminate based on gender because Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 forbids this type of discrimination.253 A tontine pension
can comply with this gender neutrality requirement by using unisex life
expectancy tables, as this Article does with its model tontine pension.254
2. Employee Contributions
Title VII’s gender-neutrality requirement somewhat undermines the
attractiveness of allowing participants to make additional voluntary contributions to their employer-provided tontine pensions. To be sure, allowing
employees to make supplemental contributions to their tontine pensions
would enhance employees’ retirement incomes, just as voluntary
contributions to 401(k) plans increase participants’ nest eggs and their
retirement income. However, tontine pensions would be a better investment
250
251

See supra Section IV.A (providing background on CalSTRS).
On the other hand, a defined contribution plan can distribute lump sums to its retirees
with the knowledge that the commercial annuities available to the retirees from private insurers
will differ based on gender. As noted above, a 65-year-old man who purchased a $100,000 annuity
in January of 2014 could receive $6864 a year for life, while a 65-year-old woman would receive
$6408 a year because of her longer life expectancy. See supra subsection I.C.2 (explaining lifetime
annuities). But see Heen, supra note 121 (discussing why we should ban gender discrimination in
the sale of commercial annuities).
252 See supra Sections II.B-C (providing an overview of tontine funds and tontine annuities).
253 See supra note 72 and accompanying text (explaining that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
prohibits pension plans from requiring higher contributions from women than men or paying
women lower benefits than men); see also Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 691 F.2d 1054,
1066 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding that defendant’s use of sex-distinct tables for calculating contributions
to a pension plan constituted unequal treatment on the basis of sex), vacated on other grounds, 463
U.S. 1223 (1983).
254 See supra note 200 and accompanying text. Unisex tables are not a perfect solution,
because they are less accurate than gender-specific tables. Unisex tables would, however, ensure
that same-age men and women who make identical contributions receive identical monthly
distributions, which is what Title VII requires for pensions.
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for women than men, given their relative life expectancies. The typical man
would be better off investing in a 401(k) plan or IRA (where gender is
irrelevant), or in a typical commercial annuity sold by an insurance company
(where gender can be considered).255
3. Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuities & Qualified
Domestic Relations Orders
Under ERISA, defined benefit plans (and some defined contribution
plans) are required to provide a qualified joint-and-survivor annuity (QJSA)
as the normal benefit payment for married participants, unless the spouse
consents to another form of distribution.256 These plans are also required to
provide a qualified pre-retirement survivor annuity (QPSA) option in case
the worker dies before retirement.257 ERISA-covered pension plans also
allow state courts to divide the pension benefits of married couples through
qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs).258 Although not covered by
ERISA, many public pension plans provide similar spousal protections.259
Tontine pensions could also be designed to provide spousal protections.
First, with respect to survivor benefits, rather than having a married
participant forfeit her entire account balance at her death, a tontine pension
could provide QJSAs and QPSAs. For example, when a participant dies, she
might forfeit half of the balance in her account; the remaining half could be

255 Again, see Heen, supra note 121 for a discussion as to why we should ban gender discrimination in the sale of annuities.
256 I.R.C. § 401(a)(11) (2012) (“[A] trust forming part of such plan shall not constitute a
qualified trust under this section unless . . . the accrued benefit payable to such participant is
provided in the form of a qualified joint and survivor annuity.”); id. § 417(a) (permitting participants to elect to waive the qualified joint and survivor annuity form, but requiring the participant’s
spouse to consent in writing); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 205(a)-(c), 29
U.S.C. § 1055(a)-(c) (2012) (same). A QJSA is an immediate annuity for the life of the pension
plan participant and a survivor annuity for the life of the participant’s spouse. Id. § 205(d)(1), 29
U.S.C. § 1055(d)(1). The amount of the survivor annuity may not be less than 50% nor more than
100% of the amount payable during the time the participant and spouse are both alive. Id., 29
U.S.C. § 1055(d)(1).
257 Id. § 205(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a). A QPSA typically pays an annuity that is equal to the
survivor’s portion of the QJSA. Id. § 205(e), 29 U.S.C. § 1055(e).
258 I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (2012); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 206(d),
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (2012).
259 See CAL. PUB. EMPS. RET. SYS., SURVIVORS & BENEFICIARIES FAQS: YOUR RETIREMENT
APPLICATION AND OPTIONS WEBINAR, available at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eipdocs/about/video-web-center/videos/member-retirement/faq-survivors.pdf (explaining that some
employers offer benefits to employees’ survivors and detailing those spousal protections).
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retitled in the name of the surviving spouse.260 Second, a tontine pension
could allow divorcing spouses to secure domestic relations orders that
transfer a portion of the participant spouse’s tontine pension to the other
spouse. This could allow the transferred portion to be retitled in the name
of the transferee spouse.261
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we showed how large employers could use tontine
pensions to provide retirement income for their employees. We developed a
model tontine pension and used that model to show the retirement benefits
that a typical worker could earn with a 10%-of-salary tontine pension. Over
the course of a 30-year career, we estimated that a typical retiree would earn
a uniform tontine pension that would initially replace approximately 55% of
her pre-retirement earnings. Alternatively, that retiree would earn an
inflation-adjusted tontine pension that would replace approximately 43% of
her pre-retirement earnings.
These tontine pensions have two major advantages over traditional
defined benefit plan pensions. First, unlike traditional pensions, which are
frequently underfunded, tontine pensions would always be fully funded.
Second, unlike traditional pensions, where the plan sponsor must bear all
the investment and actuarial risks, with a tontine pension, the plan sponsor
would bear neither of those risks. These two features make the tontine
pension a particularly attractive alternative for employers who care about
providing retirement income security for their employees but want to avoid
the risks associated with having a traditional pension.
Tontine pensions also offer a possible solution to the chronic underfunding
of state and local pension plans. For example, we showed how California
could replace its $74 billion underfunded CalSTRS defined benefit plan
with a tontine pension and never again have to worry about underfunding
attributable to future benefit accruals.
Finally, a tontine pension would closely resemble an actuarially fair variable
life annuity, but could be run by a low-fee discount broker. No money would
need to be set aside for insurance agent commissions or for insurance
260 The tontine pension of a married couple might be shared between the spouses along the
lines of earnings sharing. See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 23, at 205-06 (discussing the possibility of
earnings sharing for Social Security).
261 QDROs can present adverse selection and moral hazard issues. For example, what, if
anything, should be done to prevent a dying spouse from getting a divorce and using a QDRO to
transfer her tontine pension to her ex-spouse, rather than forfeiting it to the surviving members in
her tontine pension plan?

2015]

Tontine Pensions

827

company reserves, risk-taking, and profits. This means that tontine pensions
would provide significantly higher benefits to retirees than commercial
annuities.
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APPENDIX
Appendix Table 1 is based on the Social Security Administration’s 2009
unisex life table.262 For individuals aged 35 through 119, Column 1 shows
their age (xi), Column 2 shows their life expectancy (ei), and Column 3
shows their death probability (qi). Column 4 shows the force-of-mortality
probabilities that we derived,263 and Columns 5 and 6 show the uniform and
inflation-adjusted monthly annuity factors that we derived for the first
month of each year starting with age 65.264
Appendix Table 1: Unisex Life Tables, 2009, with Force-of-Mortality
Probabilities, and Monthly Annuity Factors265

Life
Age
Death
Force-of(xi) Expectancy Probability Mortality
(years)
(qi)
Probability
(ei)
( fi)

Uniform
InflationMonthly
adjusted
Annuity
Monthly
Factors for
Annuity
the First
Factors for the
Month of the First Month of
Year
the Year

35
36

44.90
43.95

0.001261
0.001332

0.001262
0.001333

n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a

37

43.01

0.001421

n/a

n/a

38
39
40
41
42
43
44

42.07
41.14
40.20
39.27
38.35
37.43
36.52

0.001420
0.001527
0.001653
0.001796
0.001955
0.002133
0.002332
0.002550

0.001528
0.001655
0.001798
0.001957
0.002135
0.002334
0.002553

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

262
263
264
265

Bye, supra note 109.
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 141 & 143 and accompanying text.
This data is derived from Bye, supra note 109, and authors’ computations. The monthly
annuity factors were determined using an interest rate of 7% and an inflation rate of 3%.
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Life
Age
Death
Force-of(xi) Expectancy Probability Mortality
(years)
(qi)
Probability
(ei)
( fi)

45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
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35.61
34.71
33.81
32.92
32.04
31.17
30.30
29.44
28.59
27.74
26.90
26.07
25.24
24.42
23.60
22.80
21.99
21.20
20.42
19.64
18.88
18.12
17.38
16.65
15.93
15.22

0.002786
0.003041
0.003322
0.003630
0.003963
0.004326
0.004707
0.005086
0.005455
0.005827
0.006234
0.006685
0.007166
0.007677
0.008233
0.008854
0.009552
0.010323
0.011172
0.012113
0.013181
0.014374
0.015665
0.017056
0.018576
0.020314

0.002790
0.003046
0.003328
0.003637
0.003971
0.004336
0.004718
0.005099
0.005470
0.005844
0.006253
0.006708
0.007192
0.007707
0.008267
0.008893
0.009598
0.010376
0.011235
0.012187
0.013269
0.014478
0.015789
0.017203
0.018751
0.020524

Uniform
InflationMonthly
adjusted
Annuity
Monthly
Factors for
Annuity
the First
Factors for the
Month of the First Month of
Year
the Year
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
117.6939
115.1577
112.5519
109.8756
107.1273
104.3072

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
151.9876
147.7118
143.3919
139.0295
134.6252
130.1821
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Life
Age
Death
Force-of(xi) Expectancy Probability Mortality
(years)
(qi)
Probability
(ei)
( fi)

71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

14.53
13.85
13.18
12.53
11.89
11.27
10.66
10.08
9.50
8.95
8.41
7.89
7.40
6.92
6.46
6.03
5.62
5.23
4.87
4.53
4.21
3.92
3.66
3.42
3.20
3.01

0.022277
0.024406
0.026695
0.029207
0.032111
0.035415
0.038994
0.042837
0.047063
0.051906
0.057459
0.063648
0.070515
0.078164
0.086714
0.096263
0.106880
0.118606
0.131451
0.145412
0.160474
0.176613
0.193799
0.211994
0.230169
0.248041

0.022529
0.024708
0.027058
0.029642
0.032638
0.036057
0.039774
0.043781
0.048206
0.053301
0.059175
0.065763
0.073124
0.081388
0.090706
0.101217
0.113035
0.126251
0.140931
0.157136
0.174918
0.194329
0.215422
0.238250
0.261584
0.285074
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Uniform
InflationMonthly
adjusted
Annuity
Monthly
Factors for
Annuity
the First
Factors for the
Month of the First Month of
Year
the Year
101.4239
98.4856
95.4925
92.4424
89.3370
86.1922
83.0219
79.8263
76.6015
73.3500
70.0896
66.8410
63.6153
60.4220
57.2732
54.1842
51.1716
48.2522
45.4418
42.7539
40.2005
37.7928
35.5427
33.4649
31.5809
29.8776

125.7133
121.2309
116.7370
112.2306
107.7160
103.2135
98.7408
94.2984
89.8822
85.4962
81.1612
76.9009
72.7270
68.6490
64.6789
60.8317
57.1238
53.5709
50.1868
46.9828
43.9682
41.1509
38.5397
36.1461
33.9883
32.0468
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Life
Age
Death
Force-of(xi) Expectancy Probability Mortality
(years)
(qi)
Probability
(ei)
( fi)

97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
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2.84
2.68
2.54
2.40
2.27
2.14
2.02
1.90
1.78
1.67
1.56
1.46
1.37
1.27
1.18
1.10
1.02
0.94
0.86
0.79
0.73
0.67
0.61

0.265318
0.281695
0.296871
0.312977
0.330077
0.348236
0.367528
0.388029
0.409816
0.432975
0.457593
0.483763
0.511581
0.541150
0.572575
0.605968
0.641446
0.679129
0.719145
0.761624
0.806699
0.851378
0.893947

0.308317
0.330861
0.352215
0.375388
0.400592
0.428073
0.458120
0.491070
0.527321
0.567352
0.611739
0.661189
0.716582
0.779033
0.849977
0.931323
1.025675
1.136717
1.269917
1.433908
1.643507
1.906349
2.243816

Uniform
InflationMonthly
adjusted
Annuity
Monthly
Factors for
Annuity
the First
Factors for the
Month of the First Month of
Year
the Year
28.3359
26.9285
25.6135
24.3250
23.0633
21.8287
20.6214
19.4415
18.2892
17.1642
16.0665
14.9955
13.9509
12.9316
11.9366
10.9641
10.0120
9.0770
8.1546
7.2383
6.3178
5.3799
4.0607

30.2968
28.7046
27.2223
25.7781
24.3718
23.0032
21.6719
20.3777
19.1201
17.8985
16.7122
15.5605
14.4422
13.3561
12.3004
11.2733
10.2718
9.2926
8.3307
7.3792
6.4282
5.4680
4.1685

